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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the role of information strategy and its interaction with the media 
in modern information environments. In particular it investigates how military information 
operations utilised the media to protect Coalition strategic vulnerabilities and provide the 
basis for effective war-fighting in the 2003 Iraq War. 
It investigates the role information plays in strategy, and its development into concepts of 
Information and Psychological Operations. In particular, military public communication 
methods are scrutinised, especially regarding the domestic use of psychological operations 
and military dedication to ‘truth-telling’. It is concluded that the military generally does 
communicate ‘truths’, but only ‘selected truths’ for target audiences, resulting in a 
manipulative relationship. 
Following this the media-management policies prior to the Iraq War are examined. These are 
defined as a ‘restrictive model’ which limited the amount of information the media received. 
An examination of policies during the Iraq War illustrates that the military have moved 
beyond this model, towards the information saturation of the media. This information, 
however, was of a narrow nature which appealed to media imperatives. The military’s 
policies capitalised on these developments, providing information dominance and protecting 
public will. 
Following this the legitimacy of this conduct by democratic nations is explored, arriving at 
the conclusion it is tolerated if utilised in popular wars, however this toleration depletes if 
public will is insufficient. This conclusion is linked to Clausewitz’s concepts of the trinity 
and maximum expenditure of effort in warfare. 
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To conclude, it is stated that the military attempted to instigate manipulative relationships 
with the media in order to affect domestic opinion. However, the media are partly responsible 
for this through their adoption of infotainment and commercial formats which prioritise 
spectacle over education. The military, with the aid of PR companies, understood these 
developments and set to control them with information overload, as opposed to information 
restriction. These measures are only successful however if the necessary public will has been 
generated through governmental justification. 
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Introduction 
“The first casualty when war comes is truth.” - Hiram Johnson, 19171 
Information has always been a valuable commodity in war; its control being of critical 
importance to commanders.  The preservation of operational security was often a central 
reason for information control, however, contemporary debate highlights how ‘truth’ can 
diminish or corrupt national will, hindering strategy in war. In modern warfare, the truth is 
expected to be wounded somewhere on the battlefield of military-media interaction. 
The media and military have a long, and often, contemptuous relationship. The media’s 
perceived role of ‘truth-telling’ is argued as incompatible with military priorities. For 
commanders the ‘truth’ is a dangerous concept which can kill troops and endanger 
campaigns.
2
 Unrestricted media coverage of warfare has also been attributed to the decline of 
public support for operations. The Vietnam War has long been an example of this dynamic, 
with politicians and commanders blaming the media for sabotaging public support.
3
 This 
perception led commanders and administrations to implement stricter policies of media-
management during conflict. The media are critical of such developments as it impedes their 
work, including their social responsibility to the people, as U.S Supreme Court Justice Black 
stated: “Paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of 
the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of 
foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell”.4 The role of military-media-management is to 
                                                          
1
 Johnson, Hiram quoted in Knightly, Phillip, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-
Maker From the Crimea to Kosovo, (London: Prion Books Limited, 2001) p. vii 
2
 McFeely, MAJ. Eugene L. “The News Media: Keeping the Public Informed or Intelligence for the Enemy” 
Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, (February 2004) p. ii 
3
 Carruthers, Susan L, The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century, (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 2000) p. 145 
4
 Black, Hugo quoted in Aday, Sean, Hebert, Maeve and Livingston, Steven, “Embedding the Truth: A Cross-
Cultural Analysis of Objectivity and Television Coverage of the Iraq War” The International Journal of 
Press/Politics, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Winter 2005) p. 3 
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navigate the path between providing information to satisfy the media, whilst preserving 
operational security and public support.
5
  
This dissertation will investigate this issue in relation to the 2003 Iraq War. This conflict has 
been chosen for several reasons. Firstly, it was a conflict which engendered global 
controversy, resulting in the ‘truth’ becoming central to debates. 6 Secondly, it was the first 
major conflict of a matured ‘information age’, which features internet use, 24-hour news 
channels and an international news environment.
7
 Thirdly, the war featured the embedding of 
570 to 750 journalists into front-line military units.
8
 This development attracted some 
controversy, particularly from journalists who feared such relationships would impact upon 
journalistic integrity.
9
  
This study investigates how the media were utilised by the military within informational 
strategy. Furthermore, it will question whether the media became co-opted into psychological 
operations aimed against Coalition domestic audiences. To investigate this, a range of sources 
were consulted, often originating from journalists and military personnel.  Caution was 
adopted when utilising such sources, since, as Taylor and Moorcraft note: “Nobody is more 
interested in the media than the media themselves.”10 This combined with the history of 
antagonism between the military and media, meant certain, especially critical journalists, 
such as John Pilger, were inclined to see deliberate government deception in any instance of 
misreporting or information ambiguity. Such instances could have resulted from ‘fog of war’ 
or institutional differences and misunderstandings between the military and media. Generally, 
                                                          
5
 McFeely, “The News Media” p. 3 
6
 Moorcraft, Paul L. & Taylor, Phillip M. Shooting the Messenger: The Political Impact of War Reporting, 
(Dulles, VA: Potomac Books Inc. 2008) p. 182 
7
 Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “Embedded Reporters: What Are Americans 
Getting?” http://www.journalism.org/node/211 (accessed 5/4/2012) 
8
 Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “The Vanishing Embedded Reporter in Iraq” 
http://www.journalism.org/node/2596 (accessed 5/4/2012) 
9
 Aday, et al, “Embedding the Truth” p. 4 
10
 Moorcraft & Taylor, Shooting the Messenger, p. 217 
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a level of care was adopted when dealing with media sources commenting on military and 
strategic issues they may not be qualified to accurately comment upon. The same was also 
applied to military sources commenting on media activities in warfare. Military writers 
appeared to hold different understandings of issues, including objectivity and the publics 
‘right to know’, as the media. The military often understood these issues in an operational 
sense compared to more normative appreciations by the media. 
This dissertation will concern itself with media-management during the invasion phase of the 
Iraq War. Television news coverage from US and British channels will be prioritised, 
although print media is referred to. Television became the main source of news for the public, 
as well being the medium arguably most affected by embedding.
11
 The dissertation will be 
arranged as follows: 
 Chapter 1 will investigate the role of information operations in strategy, particularly 
in post-industrial conflicts. It will further discuss the roles of Psychological 
Operations, Public Affairs and Public Relations within military-media interaction. 
 Chapter 2 will investigate the development of military media-management policies, 
following Vietnam and up-to-and-including the Iraq War. Particular events will be 
examined to illustrate how they fit into these operations. 
 Chapter 3 will discuss the implications of these developments of information strategy, 
particularly whether the West can/should legitimately utilise propaganda. 
To conclude, this dissertation will state that the Coalition’s, especially the US’s, media-
management strategy differed greatly from previous programmes. Far from excluding the 
media, it is argued that the Iraq War allowed for the saturation of the media with information, 
much of which was of a narrow, but exciting nature. Essentially, the media was allowed to 
                                                          
11
 Thussu, Daya Kishan, “Live TV and Bloodless Deaths: War, Infotainment and 24/7 News” in Freedman, Des 
and Thussu, Daya Kishan, (ed.) War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7, (London: SAGE, 2003) p. 188 
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engorge itself with imagery of great detail but little strategic context. Such information was 
less likely to adversely affect public opinion, but instead appealed to networks’ commercial 
imperatives while promoting war as entertainment. This dynamic allowed the military to 
divert attention from controversies regarding the war’s justification towards ‘conflict 
spectation’ which engendered and promoted jingoistic narratives. However, such techniques 
are only effective if preceding government information campaigns have provided solid 
justification for the conflict. 
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Chapter 1: Information Operations and Strategy 
“There are two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run the sword will 
always be beaten by the mind.” – Napoleon12 
The Role of Information and Public Opinion in Strategy 
The use of information in warfare is as old as warfare itself, indeed every use of force results 
in ‘information’ that impacts upon all belligerents. Sun Tzu’s, The Art of War, stresses the 
importance of information and psychology, stating: “All warfare is based on deception,”13 
“Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril,”14 and, 
“To win a hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the 
enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”15 Furthermore, Sun Tzu places the use of 
information above kinetic force, stating that: “What is of supreme importance in war is to 
attack the enemy’s strategy… Next best is to disrupt his alliances… The next best is to attack 
his army… The worst policy is to attack cities.”16 The attacking of strategy and alliances does 
not necessarily require force, but can be accomplished through the use of deception and 
manipulation – notions related to informational warfare. 
Within modern conflict, however, commanders do not hold informational monopolies. This is 
related the communication of politics in modern conflicts, for, as Clausewitz stated: “War is 
                                                          
12
 Bonaparte, Napoleon quoted in Taylor, Phillip M, “The Fourth Arm and the Fourth Estate: Psychological 
Operations and the Media” in Connelly, Mark & Welch, David, War and the Media: Reportage and 
Propaganda, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005) p. 252 
13
 Sun Tzu, trans. Griffith, Samuel B, The Art of War, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) p. 66 
14
 Ibid. p. 84 
15
 Ibid. p. 77 
16
 Ibid. pp. 77/78 
Mark Newton Strategic News Management in the Iraq War 119000209 
11 
 
the mere continuation of policy by other means”.17 Policy, and therefore war, is now 
increasingly communicated via the media.
18
 As Brown states: 
“Media coverage has effects not simply on ‘the audience’ understood as a set of passive 
bystanders, but on those actually and potentially involved in the conflict. Shaping the 
perceptions of opponents, supporters and neutral groups influences whether they will become 
involved and how they will participate.”19 
Western commanders, wishing to control information, must increasingly compete with the 
media who are the main informational medium.
20
 This is particularly important in relation to 
issues of public support for conflicts, as Western societies require public support for 
successful war-fighting. Commanders have long acknowledged this requirement, General 
Eisenhower stated: “Fundamentally, public opinion wins wars”, while earlier Napoleon, 
claimed: “Four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand bayonets.”21 
Democracies conduct war at the behest of governments supported by the people. Politicians 
are therefore reactive to public opinion, which in turn impacts upon strategy. For example, 
during the Falklands War, interdiction of Argentinian aircraft in Argentina made military 
sense, but was not conducted. Furthermore, during the NATO campaign in Kosovo, bombing 
was restricted to above 15,000 feet. These decisions did not result purely from military 
thinking but rather attempts to maintain public support.
22
 Regarding the Falklands War, the 
extension of warfare to Argentina would have been harder to justify to domestic and global 
                                                          
17
 von Clausewitz, Carl, trans. Howard, Michael & Peret, Peter, On War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1989) p. 87 
18
 Brown, Robin, “Spinning the War: Political Communications, Information Operations and Public Diplomacy 
in the War on Terrorism” in Freedman, Des and Thussu, Daya Kishan, (ed.) War and the Media: Reporting 
Conflict 24/7, (London: SAGE, 2003) p. 87 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. p. 88 
21
 Eisenhower, Dwight D and Bonaparte, Napoleon quoted in Taverner, LT COL. Angus, “Learning the Lessons 
of the 20th Century: The Evolution in British Military Attitude to the Media on Operations and in War” in 
Connelly, Mark & Welch, David, War and the Media: Reportage and Propaganda, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005) 
p. 266 
22
 Ibid. 
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opinion, while, in Kosovo, bombing below 15,000 feet placed air crews into range of anti-
aircraft batteries. The loss of NATO personnel could have major domestic ramifications in 
NATO nations, where intervention was not universally popular. Public support is therefore 
central to the maintenance and efficiency of war-fighting, Clausewitz recognised this 
dynamic in developing his ‘trinity of warfare’, consisting of three interrelated and supportive 
forces, commonly defined ‘army, state and people’. For successful war Clausewitz stated the 
“passions to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people”, as such he is 
articulating the importance of public support or ‘passion’ in war. A strategy which ignores 
any one of these elements will be “totally useless”.23 
The use of information by the media and military results in the construction of ‘Idea 
Battlespaces’ which are separate, but related to, ‘Kinetic Battlespaces’. Within ‘Idea 
Battlespaces’ messages compete for dominance; those which receive the most attention and 
belief from target groups dominate.
24
 For example, a commander wishing to elicit surrender 
of troops may communicate messages such as “continue to fight and you will be killed”, this 
will compete against the enemy’s messages to their troops such as “continue to fight and we 
will be victorious.” ‘Surrender’ messages could be communicated through leaflet drops, 
loudspeakers or other mediums. However, kinetic force also generates messages - killing 
large amounts of the enemy clearly communicates the “continue fighting and you’ll be killed” 
message.
25
 This combination can result in information acting as a powerful force multiplier. 
The Idea Battlespace does not just apply to theatre operations. Domestic populations will also 
receive competing messages, often communicated via the media.
26
 To be successful 
commanders are increasingly required to manage the media output, as Laity explains: “In an 
                                                          
23
 Clausewitz, On War, p. 89. 
24
 Allen, Patrick D. Information Operations Planning, (Boston: Artech House, 2007), p. 114 
25
 Ibid. 115 
26
 Laity, Mark, “Straddling the Divide - Spinning for Both Sides” in Connelly, Mark & Welch, David, War and 
the Media: Reportage and Propaganda, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005) p. 275 
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uncertain age of highly conditional half-victories, harnessing the power of the media is now a 
prime factor in who wins.”27  
Since the early 1990s Britain and the US have become increasingly receptive to informational 
warfare concepts. This adoption is relatable to broader developments in strategy resulting 
from experiences in the Gulf War and emerging concepts of a ‘Revolution in Military 
Affairs’.28  
This led to the rise of military doctrine referred to as Information Operations (IO). This is 
defined by Joint Publication 3-13 as actions which “influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp 
adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”29 The elements 
of IO have engendered debate between branches of the military, however often it is seen as 
involving: “psychological operations, operations security, public affairs, electronic warfare, 
military deception, and others.”30 Furthermore, IO is incorporated into US strategic thinking 
as part of ‘Effect-Based Operations’ (EBO), which is defined as “actions… designed to 
achieve specific effects that contribute directly to desired military and political outcomes.”31 
EBO involves the employment of all instruments of national power - ‘diplomatic, 
informational, military and economy’ - against opposing ‘political, military, economic, social, 
information and infrastructure’ capabilities.32 These concepts illustrate an appreciation of the 
changing nature of warfare, and the importance of information, within the US military. Arkin 
stated: “Rumsfeld and his senior aides are revisiting missions and creating new agencies to 
                                                          
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Webster, Frank, “Information Warfare in an Age of Globilization” in Freedman, Des and Thussu, Daya 
Kishan, (ed.) War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7, (London: SAGE, 2003) p. 62 
29
 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations” (Washington D.C.: The Joint Staff, 
2006) p. GL-9 
30
 Elstad, MAJ. Peter L, “Overcoming Information Operations Legal Limitations in Support of Domestic 
Operations” U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, (2008) p. 1 
31
 Negron, COL Jose, “Analyzing Effects-Based Operations” white paper (Langley Air Force Base, VA: Air 
Combat Command, 2002) 
32
 Allen, Information Operations Planning, pp. 18/19 
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make ‘information warfare’ a central element of any US war.”33 Indeed Victoria Clarke, who 
was responsible for the Pentagon public affairs during the Iraq War, claims to have been 
involved in strategic planning from the start.
34
 
The post-industrial nature of warfare also increases the importance of information. Industrial 
war traditionally concerned territory between industrialised states and involved the mass-
mobilisation of populations and state infrastructure and information control.
35
 Modern 
warfare, however, is increasingly characterised as ‘information warfare’ consisting of smaller, 
professional armies comprising ‘knowledge warriors’ utilising advanced equipment. As such 
civilian participation, in the West, is relegated to the fringes of war effort.
 36
  Furthermore, 
conflicts are often short and asymmetrical, with Western forces employing superior firepower 
and command.
37
 Preservation of public support plays a central role in these conflicts. Within 
industrial ‘total war’ public support is often assumed as national survival is at stake, however, 
in post-industrial ‘wars of choice’, where Western populations are not directly threatened, 
public support must be maintained. This is achieved through providing solid justification, as 
well as limiting operations to what is perceived as just and proportionate.
38
 Darley claims that 
as conflicts move away from the Clausewitzian concept of ‘total war’ they more clearly 
represent ‘pure politics’ and as such IO and non-kinetic options will become increasing 
important (figure 1).
39
 
                                                          
33
 Arkin, William summarised by Miller, Laura, Stauber, John and Rampton, Sheldon, “War is Sell” in Miller, 
David (ed.) Tell me lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq, (London: Pluto Press, 2004) p. 
46 
34
 Brookes, Rod, Lewis, Justin, Mosdell, Nick & Threadgold, Terry Shoot First and Ask Questions Later: Media 
Coverage of the 2003 Iraq War, (New York: Peter Lang, 2006) pp. 39/40 
35
 Webster, “Information Warfare in an Age of Globilization” pp. 61/62 
36
 Ibid. p. 62 
37
 Ibid. pp. 62/63 
38
 Taverner, LT COL, “Learning the Lessons of the 20th Century” p. 267 
39
 Darley, COL. William “Clausewitz’s Theory of War and Information Operations.” Joint Force Quarterly, iss. 
40, (1st Quarter 2006) p. 78 
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The importance of public opinion in post-industrial conflict means it can be considered a 
‘centre of gravity’ (COG) of Western war-machines. Clausewitz stated:  
“... one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these 
characteristics a certain centre of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which 
everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed.”40  
                                                          
40
 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 595/596 
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Therefore, a COG could be considered the critical spot of belligerents’ war machines. 
Traditionally, a COG could be a city, army or commander; however, increasingly for the 
West public opinion is central to strategy, as US Joint Operations doctrine explains: 
“National will can also be a COG, as it was for the United States during the Vietnam and 
Persian Gulf Wars.”41 The US military appeared to recognise this development prior to the 
Iraq War, with Stahl stating that Rumsfeld in 2002 advocated moving away from “threat-
based” models concerned with external adversaries to “capabilities-based” models examining 
weaknesses within the US military.
42
 The media could have been recognised as a ‘weakness’ 
within the structure, therefore generating the media-management policies of the Iraq War. 
The media is particularly important as it can turn the ‘tactical’ into the ‘strategic’. This 
phenomenon has been referred to as ‘the Strategic Corporal’ and states that activity which 
occurs at the lower levels of command, once reported by the media, can go on to have major 
strategic and political consequences.
43
 Examples include the bombing of the Basra Road 
during Desert Storm. The attack of retreating Iraqi forces, although making tactical military 
sense, was controversial due to its media framing as a massacre.
44
 This highlights the 
limitations the military faces due to public pressure. The attack was in military terms a ‘no-
brainer’ as retreating forces can regroup, indeed the attack was similar to Allied bombing of 
retreating German forces at Falaise in 1944.
45
 Whereas in total war this was tolerated by the 
public, they were unwilling to do so in limited conflict, as Colin Powell stated afterwards: 
“The television coverage... was starting to make it look as if we were engaged in slaughter for 
slaughter’s sake...’46 There are examples of the ‘Strategic Corporal’ during the Iraq War and 
                                                          
41
 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations” (Washington D.C.: The Joint Staff, 
2001) p. III-23 
42
 Stahl, Roger, Militainment, Inc: War, Media and Popular Culture, (London: Routledge, 2010) p. 36 
43
 Taverner, LT COL, “Learning the Lessons of the 20th Century” p. 270 
44
 Laity, “Straddling the Divide - Spinning for Both Sides” p. 278 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Ibid. p. 279 
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its aftermath, such as the Abu Ghraib scandal, fall of the Firdos Square Statue and friendly 
fire incidents.
47
 Even a single casualty can have strategic consequences, as Laity explains: 
“...if a grieving relative condemns the conflict on the front page of a tabloid, in media terms 
there is nothing that can be done.”48 This has resulted in politicians and commanders 
becoming involved in lower levels of military activity, as well as increasing the requirement 
for media-management.
49
 This is especially true as commanders realise the advantages the 
‘Strategic Corporal’ gives to asymmetrical fighters, such as insurgents, who traditionally 
could not operate at strategic levels.
50
 
The US, prior to the Iraq War, appeared to recognise this trend. IO plays a central role in their 
concept of ‘Full Spectrum Dominance’ developed in 2000.51 This doctrine advocates the 
combined use of all forces to allow domination of space, sea, land, air and information.
52
 
Information dominance is defined as having two goals: “building up and protecting friendly 
information” and “degrading information received by your adversary”53 To achieve this 
dominance, it is argued that the US must manage, or perhaps, manipulate information and the 
news media to generate favourable narratives.
54
 This is the responsibility of Influence 
Operations, a subsection of IO, which primarily consists of Psychological Operations 
(PSYOP) and Public Affairs (PA).
55
 
 
 
                                                          
47
 Allen, Information Operations Planning, p. 13 
48
 Laity, “Straddling the Divide - Spinning for Both Sides” pp. 282/283 
49
 Taverner, LT COL, “Learning the Lessons of the 20th Century” p. 270 
50
 Garrison, COL. W.C. “Information Operations and Counter-Propaganda: Making a Weapon of Public Affairs” 
Army War College, Carlisle Barracks PA, (March 1999) p. 2 
51
 Stahl, Militainment, Inc, p. 36 
52
 Brookes et al. Shoot First and Ask Questions Later,  p. 18/19 
53
 Giffin, John & Winters, Jim “Information Dominance Point Paper” 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/info-dominance/id.htm (accessed 05/09/2012) 
54
 Brookes et al. Shoot First and Ask Questions Later, p. 20 
55
 Allen, Information Operations Planning, p. 109 
Mark Newton Strategic News Management in the Iraq War 119000209 
18 
 
Psychological Operations and Public Affairs 
PSYOP has a long history, tracing back to British leaflet dropping in World War I.
56
 By 
World War II, the US began to develop this new ‘fourth fighting arm’, instigating the 
Psychological Warfare Branch. The responsibility of this division was primarily tactical and 
involved “the dissemination of propaganda designed to undermine the enemy’s will to resist, 
demoralise his forces and sustain the morale of our supporters.” 57 Lord, writing in 1989, 
identified that PSYOP had been hindered by the inability of commanders to elevate it to 
strategic levels,
58
 in addition to its reputation and association with ‘black’ activities, such as 
deceit.
59
 However, the media also has a long relationship with PSYOP; its activities often 
imitate media methods, while during total war the media often assisted it.
60
 Indeed, 
newspaper proprietor Lord Northcliffe was instrumental in establishing the ‘Department of 
Propaganda in Enemy Countries’ following WWI.61 However, with the demise of total war 
this relationship soured. Furthermore, PSYOP has been accused of being directed against 
domestic audiences, blurring its distinction with PA, which is tasked with communicating 
truthfully with home audiences.
62
 
‘Information warriors’ often stress the differences between PSYOP and PA.63 Firstly, PSYOP 
is often defined as something which happens on, or around, the battlefield, and is more a 
tactical force multiplier than strategic tool. However, PSYOP has played a role in 
communicating on a strategic level, especially during the Cold War, with instruments such as 
                                                          
56
 Taylor, Phillip “The Fourth Arm and the Fourth Estate” p. 252 
57
 Paddock Jr, Alfred H, “Military Psychological Operations” in Barnett, Frank R & Lord, Carnes (ed.) Political 
Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the US Approach, (Washington DC: National Defense 
University Press in cooperation with National Strategy Information Centre, 1989) p. 46 
58
 Lord, Carnes “The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy” in Barnett, Frank R & Lord, Carnes (ed.) 
Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the US Approach, (Washington DC: National 
Defense University Press in cooperation with National Strategy Information Centre, 1989) p. 28 
59
 Brookes et al. Shoot First and Ask Questions Later, p. 20 
60
 Taylor, “The Fourth Arm and the Fourth Estate” p. 255 
61
 Ibid. p. 252 
62
 Brookes et al. Shoot First and Ask Questions Later, p. 17 
63
 Ibid. 34 
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Radio Free Europe.
 64
 A second difference is that PA is not supposed to intentionally deceive, 
‘but is restricted to telling the truth as best as it is known at any given time.’65 PSYOP is 
under no such restrictions and, occasionally, deceiving foreign troops and civilians is its 
objective.
66
 Truth-telling is stated as central to successful PA, doctrine states: “[the] goal of 
any Public Affairs staff is to support an operational commander in achieving a constant flow 
of complete, accurate and timely information about the mission and U.S. forces.”67 Truth-
telling is essential as it maintains the credibility of the military, while the speedy release of 
accurate information also provides information initiative. If the media discovered PA officials 
were spreading false information it would compromise their credibility allowing enemy 
information to dominate in the Idea Battlespace.
68
 Therefore, PSYOP and PA can be defined 
as ‘offence’ and ‘defence’.69 PSYOP’s objective is to ‘push’ audiences towards desired 
behaviour, potentially through the use of deception, while PA ‘pulls’ audiences by countering 
enemy disinformation with truth.
70
 Rid also argues distinct organisational differences exist 
between PA and PSYOP, with officers following different training and career paths in 
separate organisations.
71
 Furthermore, there are contrasting mindsets between the functions. 
PA officers, Rid claims, “...tend to be proud and idealistic patriots who would like the 
greatness, the merits, and the dedication of their service’s troops to be reported in the national 
media”, while IO, including PSYOP, officers tend “...mostly to think pragmatically in a 
warrior’s mindset, willing to use the media as a means to put psychological pressure on the 
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adversary or to deceive him.” 72 Indeed, PA doctrine states: “Under no circumstances will 
public affairs personnel engage in PSYOP activities.”73 
A major legal difference is that PSYOP cannot be used domestically, but only against foreign 
populations. This is provided by the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 which established the 
“preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the United States, its people, 
and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information 
media.” It continues: “any such information shall not be disseminated within the United 
States.”74 
However, there is debate concerning how pronounced these differences are. Although 
PSYOP and PA should remain separate they still operate under the purview of ‘Influence 
Operations’. Operations between IO elements are often coordinated into wider campaigns, 
blurring boundaries.
75
 Rid argues that many information warriors view PA as an element of 
IO and a weapon of war, despite attempts by PA to distance itself from PSYOP.
76
 However, 
PA doctrine recognises that “Information campaign objectives cannot be neatly divided by 
discipline, such as PA, CA [civil affairs] and PSYOP. The responsible organization cannot be 
easily determined solely by looking at the medium, the message or the audience.”77 This 
difficulty in role definition is evident in both military and academic defining of these 
elements. For example Rid uses the revised Joint Pub 3-13 definition stated above
78
 which 
suggests IO can be responsible for deception.
79
 However, Global Focus.org state that “IO 
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products are almost always truthful and accurate, or should be. Psyops products may or may 
not be accurate or truthful and may be intentionally deceptive or dishonest.”80 This latter 
definition suggests PSYOP, not PA, is the exception within IO. This confusion of definitions 
and functions is relatively widespread, with different branches defining these differently.
81
  
There are also contradictions within military definitions which also exacerbate this issue. For 
example Joint Publication 3-53 states: “PA operators and activities shall not focus on 
directing or manipulating public actions or opinions.”82 This definition clashes with FM 3-
61.1 Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures which states the role of PA is to 
“present the Army’s perspective” in order to establish “confidence in and support for 
American soldiers” and “America’s Army to accomplish the assigned mission in accordance 
with our national values”.83 This definition states PA ‘directs’ public opinion towards support 
for troops. Taylor states PA provides journalists with information, however the selection of 
information will help shape perceptions.
84
 Although the information communicated may be 
truthful it may not represent the situation accurately. For example, the prioritisation of 
footage showing precision-guided strikes during Desert Storm suggested that the entire 
bombing campaign was precise, despite 90% of munitions being unguided.
85
 Further 
evidence of this ‘directing’ of information is also present in FM 3-61.1. It states PA officers 
should, “determine the information needs of the various target audiences”, and then deliver 
information based on audience “requirements”. Information is then developed into “products” 
for dissemination to the target audience.
86
 Therefore, PA does not release all information to a 
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homogenous audience, but selects which ‘truths’ it releases to specific audiences, perhaps 
making its activities manipulative. Indeed, its activities appear to adhere to Joint Publication 
1-02 definition of ‘propaganda’: “any form of communication in support of national 
objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes or behaviour of any group 
in order to benefit the sponsor...”87 PA’s functions appears to correlate with PSYOP, defined 
by Joint Publication 3-13 as “operations to convey selected information and indicators to 
foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately 
the behaviour of foreign governments, organisations, groups and individuals”.88 The only 
major difference is that PSYOP must be directed at foreign audiences, its use of ‘selected 
information’, is also the central tenet of PA. Therefore, PA could essentially be considered 
‘domestic PSYOP’. The limitation that PA cannot lie does not affect this conclusion, as the 
selective use of ‘truths’ can be equally manipulative, indeed, de Rooij, states that the 
functions of PA “fits directly into a psy-ops framework.”89 However, this applies mainly to 
US operations; British PA appears to have remained distinct from PSYOP. For example 
Pawson, Director General of Corporate Communications, stated that they wished to distance 
themselves from the ‘American approach’, claiming: “We are quite clear to separate out 
media operations from, if you like, information and deception type of work.”90 Indeed, in 
2000, European newspapers revealed that during the Kosovo War US PSYOP officers 
worked at CNN as part of an internship programme. FAIR.org claims the military could have 
used the opportunity to gain intelligence on domestic media methods.
 91
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The nature of the modern media environment has also eroded the distinction between PSYOP 
and PA. Messages communicated by PSYOP to foreign audiences can be discovered by 
domestic media and rebroadcast at home.
92
 An example of this, discussed below, is the 
toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue in Firdos Square.
93
 Effectively, this inability to isolate 
the target audience led Wilson to conclude “a sharp distinction between foreign and domestic 
audiences cannot be maintained”,94 further blurring distinctions between PSYOP and PA. 
One element that arose prominently in the US prior to the Iraq War is the use of Public 
Relations (PR) firms in PA strategy.
95
 PR is a specialised occupation in which, similarly to 
PA, ‘persuasive communications techniques are utilised in order to try and influence what are 
dubbed ‘target publics’.’96 PR Week, stated that Rumsfeld was developing an informal 
‘strategic communications group’ to assist in developing Pentagon messages.97 One PR 
company, the Rendon Group, in particular, specialises in assisting US military operations. 
This relationship developed during the Gulf War where it helped organise and promote the 
Iraqi National Congress (INC).
98
 Rendon’s firm was reemployed in 2001 and assisted with 
the development of the controversial Office of Strategic Influence.
99
 Another prominent 
member of the media-management policy was Victoria Clarke, who is largely seen as 
responsible for developing the embedding programme. Clarke originally ran an office of PR 
firm, Hill and Knowlton, who were implicated in orchestrating the fabricated “babies torn 
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from incubators story” which played a role in justifying involvement in the Gulf War.100 
Clarke stated that she planned to run Pentagon operations in the same way she ran corporate 
campaigns.
101
 Other prominent PR specialists and firms involved in the US PA campaign 
include Charlotte Beers, an advertising specialist appointed as Undersecretary for Public 
Diplomacy in 2001, and Benador Associates, which worked with many pro-war and 
republican organisations, such as the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq.
102
 
The use of PR companies may have influenced the military to rely on ‘spin’ as a means of 
achieving information dominance. ‘Spin’ has long been used by both governments and 
corporations, both of which frequently employ PR companies.
103
 Maltese states that 
“spinning a story involves twisting it to one’s advantage, using surrogates, press releases, 
radio actualities, and other friendly sources to deliver the line from an angle that puts the 
story in the best possible light.”104 Furthermore, Campbell claims this concept involves 
influencing coverage through the staging of events and/or the “creation of a manipulative 
relationship with journalists”.105 Both of these elements occurred during the Iraq War, as 
discussed below. Spin could be attractive to PA practitioners as it stands between the 
deception of PSYOP and the ‘truth-telling’ of PA. It allows for credibility by telling the truth; 
however in this case ‘truth’ is plural. Spin acts to encourage the adoption of its ‘truth’, which 
represents their interests most beneficially. Brown claims this “seeks to balance an active 
approach to shaping the media environment with a broader commitment to some rules of the 
game.”106 
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This illustrates a tendency for the military to devote resources to the management of domestic 
public opinion. This is conducted by PA, which uses selected ‘truths’ to communicate 
information publicly. However, it could also involve the input of PSYOP, either through 
deliberate communication with the public, or through information tailored to foreign 
audiences being ‘domesticated’. There is little evidence to suggest PA regularly lies, but to 
suggest a dedication to full disclosure of military information would be inaccurate, firstly for 
operational security issues, and secondly because such a disclosure could damage strategy. 
The military have certainly acknowledged this; a Ministry of Defence document notes: “we 
need to be aware of the ways in which public attitudes might shape and constrain military 
activity.”107 Therefore public opinion, or ‘passion’, may be just as likely to ‘constrain’ 
strategy as support it. This is supported by scholars who claim that post-industrial war is 
becoming post-’trinitarian’, or post-Clausewitzian.108 As Western conflicts are no longer 
‘wars of national survival’ the public may increasingly view conflict as more of a ‘spectator-
sport’ where support is not guaranteed.109 Clausewitz is not entirely redundant however; 
public opinion may induce a ‘heavy dose of Clausewitzian friction’ during wartime.110 For 
Clausewitz, ‘friction’ is forces which impact detrimentally on belligerents’ war-fighting, be it 
the weather, enemy resistance or logistical issues.
111
 The fact that the informational element 
of national power is dependent on non-governmental entities means that unrestricted media 
coverage can affect public opinion, and therefore strategy.
112
 As such the relationship 
between the military/administration and the public may be one which is increasingly 
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adversarial. Curtis explains that during war with Yugoslavia the MoD identified public 
opinion as a ‘target’ along with Milosevic and his supporters. He concludes that “both are 
enemies, albeit in different ways.”113 The word ‘target’ may therefore be more than semantic, 
with the public being seen as another body which must be ‘dominated’ in an informational 
sense. However, Major Schmidt states that there are ‘targets’ that must be destroyed and 
‘targets’ that must be protected - public opinion is the latter.114 Moreover, Allen states that 
“IO, by definition, involves an adversarial situation” in which information sources are 
required to attack and defend.
115
 If public opinion is a target to defend, then the media, which 
influences the public, must be a target to attack. This conclusion is critical in examining the 
motives behind media-management policies during the Iraq War. Clausewitz stated that 
‘friction’ can only be overcome with battle experience, therefore pre-Iraq War media policies 
will be examined to provide a background the those which developed later.
116
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Chapter 2: Military Media-Management Policy –  
Vietnam to Iraq 
“Hello, Bob, come back to lose this one for us, too?”  
- Veteran officer of the Vietnam War to Bob Simon of CBS during 1991 Gulf War.
117
 
Pre-Iraq War Media-Management Policy – The ‘Restrictive Model’ 
Prior to the Vietnam War it was assumed that the media would support government and 
military objectives by reporting in a jingoistic and positive fashion, as it had done during 
previous total wars.
118
 However, following the Vietnam War, the belief that the media was 
responsible for defeat, through its negative reporting and use of graphic imagery, 
developed.
119
 Indeed, there was no official censorship in Vietnam, primarily because 
President Johnson had not officially declared war.
120
 Therefore, Vietnam highlights the 
importance of public opinion as a COG in ‘wars of choice’.121 Modern analysis of the 
Vietnam War broadly disagrees with the initial assessment of many officers and 
academics.
122
 Far from being negative, media coverage was generally supportive, at least 
until the Tet Offensive of 1968, by which time public opinion had already soured.
123
 Other 
sources of discontent were more likely to affect public opinion, for example the rising 
casualty rate was significant, especially as the war continued and more US citizens either had 
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direct experience of the war or were relatives of casualties.
124
 Furthermore, domestic 
coverage of anti-war demonstrations may have been more influential than war coverage as it 
publicised dissent and generated a sense of solidarity.
125
 Generally, the media was much 
more likely to follow dissent, and reinforce pre-existing opinions than generate opposition.
126
 
Indeed, less than half of US television owners watched network news, while attentiveness to 
television coverage was low.
127
 Carruthers concludes that “...television may have confirmed 
the trend towards disillusionment, but many academics are adamant that television did not set 
it; indeed was, in fact, considerably to its rear.”128 It is now generally understood that a 
hamstrung strategy, which failed to capitalise on tactical successes and ignored the 
psychological-political dimensions of war was responsible for defeat.
129
 
130
 However, the 
‘myth’ that the media lost the war was pervasive and permeated much of the officer corps; in 
turn, it was passed on to junior officers with no actual experience of the conflict.
131
 Rid 
claims this ‘lesson’ was rarely written in doctrine but was communicated tacitly through 
narratives and anecdotes. Braestrup stated there is “no question that television coverage of 
Vietnam lingers large in the minds of senior military officers.”132 This legacy may have 
influenced members of the Bush administration prior to the Iraq War. Prominent members 
such as Rumsfeld, Cheney and Powell; all developed their careers in this post-Vietnam era.  
The overwhelming lesson from Vietnam, as Belknap in 2002 concludes, was “Keep the press 
out!”133 Lord claims this lesson is critical for limited wars, because “the stakes in such 
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conflicts are relatively low, the pressure for preserving peacetimes rules of media 
engagement are difficult to resist.” He concluded in 1989 that “it is precisely these conflicts 
in which the political and psychological element in war is predominant, and which are 
therefore most susceptible to influence by media reporting.” His response to this issue was to 
restrict or eliminate media presence.
 134
 
The Falklands War is a prime example of restrictive models of media-management.
135
 The 
media aboard the British expedition to the Falklands were limited in their ability to report 
back to Britain, since they were dependent on military communications; this provided the 
military with measures of control.
136
 Jesser and Young claim the military utilised this 
monopoly to manipulate and limit the media’s impact in this short campaign.137 The US 
adopted similar policies which were instigated in later conflicts.
138
 The invasions of Grenada 
and Panama in particular illustrate this; journalists were often refused entry to the battle-zone 
or allowed entry after the conclusion of hostilities. Those who gained access were restricted 
to ‘pools’ under military travel constraints. 139 Secretary of Defense at the time, Dick Cheney 
was largely responsible for these measures, perhaps illustrating a disdain for media reporting 
which would affect policies in Iraq.
140
 Media criticism following Grenada led to the 
establishment of the Sidle Committee, which although stating that the media should be 
facilitated by the military, also asserted that the pool system should be retained as the only 
feasible means of access.
141
 During the Gulf War journalists were, once again, restricted to 
pools and accompanied by minders.
142
 Only a fraction of journalists, often those with a 
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history of positive reporting, gained access to frontline units.
143
 Therefore, much of the 
information available to journalists came from military briefings containing ‘carefully vetted 
pool footage of military successes [the journalists] had not remotely witnessed.’144  
However, by 2003 attitudes had shifted, far from excluding the media, they were invited into 
the military, with seemingly little restrictions.
145
 FM 3-61.1 acknowledges the post-Vietnam 
frustrations of the media, expressing that pools only be used as a ‘last resort’.146 The 
document contains a quote by General Peay, stating: “It is important to support the efforts of 
the media and our dealings with them should not be confrontational, but professional and 
courteous.”147 This shift was influenced by several factors, primarily it was understood that 
the 21
st
 century media would not depend on military communication facilities, instead they 
could utilise light-weight satellite dishes to report to editors.
148
 Taverner concludes: “In short, 
technology has unshackled the media and the military has accepted that engagement is the 
only option; avoidance and control only leading to antagonism and consequent negative 
coverage.”149 Another factor is the increase in attention afforded Information Warfare 
following the Gulf War, especially concepts of ‘command and control warfare’ which 
prioritises information.
150
 Despite media misgivings about the Gulf War, for many it was 
defined by a “CNN Phenomenon”, whereby the media played a critical role in publically 
chronicling and presenting the war.
151
 
An understanding of the media’s strategic potential, combined with decreases in ability to 
control the media arguably resulted in a situation whereby the media was ‘weaponised’ for 
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strategic use.
152
 For Laity, the media is usually a weapon the West must defend against,
153
 
however, Rid states that the media can be used by the West to help win wars by combining 
Clausewitzian concepts that “War is an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will” with 
Sun Tzu’s emphasis on the psychological dimension.154 This allows the West to utilise the 
media as a ‘force multiplier’, which improves combat efficiency by ensuring high morale and 
public support.
155
 
Evidence of this could be seen in changes to operation naming conventions during the 1990s. 
Traditionally, operation titles should be ambiguous so as to not convey sensitive information 
(for example Operation Husky
156
, Linebacker
157
).
158
 However, throughout the 1990s titles 
contained increasingly normative elements, For example: ‘Operation Just Cause’159 ‘Provide 
Comfort’160, ‘Restore Hope’161, ‘Uphold Democracy’162, ‘Noble Anvil’163, ‘Enduring 
Freedom’164 and ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’.165 166 Rampton and Stauber claim that every 
time such titles were mentioned in the media it “implicitly endorsed White House claims 
about the motives of war,”167 while Thussu claims they develop a ‘feel-good factor’ in 
Western populations.
168
 The British military retained the traditional conventions, titling the 
invasion of Iraq ‘Operation TELIC’.169 
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These media-management developments coalesced during the Iraq War, in which the media 
were given greater access to front-line units. The media had long advocated for this, 
especially due to the emergence of 24/7 news and its insatiable informational appetite.
170
 
Brookes et al. claim that the relative lack of criticism for embedding was primarily due to 
requirements to fill air-time.
171
 Initially, embedding seemed to benefit both the media and 
military, reaching what, Robert Fox, termed ‘The Bargain’ based on mutual respect and 
understanding.
172
 Rid claims that embedding created a situation where commanders’ and 
reporters’ objectives converged: “The traditional zero-sum thinking of opposed interests and 
structural conflicts between the two institutions gave way to a positive-sum logic.”173 For the 
media they gained the access to news-worthy stories, for the military they were able to 
weaponise the media. 
Criticism of this relationship may have been reduced by the domestic environment following 
9/11.
174
 Firstly, the War on Terror did not fit well into the traditional interpretative 
frameworks of the press regarding conflict. The ‘terrorism’ narrative had overwritten inter-
state narratives, while the unexpectedness of 9/11 handed the initiative to the administration 
who led the framing of the situation.
175
  The Project for a New American Century, which 
contained high-ranking Bush officials, advocated maintaining global US pre-eminence, 
which they claimed would require “some catastrophic and catalysing event – like a New Pearl 
Harbor”.176 9/11 provided the opportunity some neoconservatives may have been waiting for; 
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allowing for its rapid exploitation. Furthermore, the administration became increasingly 
aggressive towards dissenting media, with White House Press Secretary Fleischer stating they 
should “watch what they say, what they do.”177 Secondly, the nature of the 9/11 attacks led to 
the emergence of emotive and attached reporting styles.
178
 Such styles conflict with the 
media’s professional role as detached, objective purveyors of information - 9/11 resulted in a 
situation whereby reporter Gereldo Rivera could publicly claim that he wished to kill Bin 
Laden and “kick his head in, then bring it home and bronze it.”179 
However, there was some criticism of the Coalition’s media policy. Indeed, the US Office of 
Strategic Influence was disbanded amongst controversy that it planned to leak false stories 
into foreign press.
180
 Although some have claimed this accusation was unfounded, the 
incident illustrates the media was not entire placated.
181
 
Nevertheless, there was little mainstream criticism of embedding; instead it was often marked 
with enthusiasm.
182
 Criticism was limited to the ‘old breed’ of war-correspondents, such as 
Pilger and Hersh, who saw it as an attempt to co-opt and manipulate journalists.
183
 More 
contemporary analysis of embedding often provides similar claims. 
Coalition Media-Management in Iraq 
The hallmark of Coalition media-management policy during Iraq was embedding - the 
placing of journalists (known as ‘embeds’) into military units for the duration of the conflict. 
The concept is not new, with journalists previously accompanying troops, however the 
difference in Iraq would be their semi-permanent status with one unit and their inability to 
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freely roam.
184
 Experiments with embedding were conducted during the Afghanistan 
campaign in 2001/2. The experiments were seen as successful as media coverage largely 
remained positive, while military success was extrapolated to suggest success in the entire 
War on Terror.
 185
 The Coalition Information Centers, were also established during this 
conflict.
186
 Originally developed by Downing Street Director of Communications Alistair 
Campbell, their purpose was to ensure Coalition messages were consistent.
187
 The US later 
morphed the CIC, into the Office of Global Communications (OGC),
188
 which Rampton and 
Stauber claim was designed to control “the message within the administration, so no one - not 
even Vice President Dick Cheney - freelances on Iraq.”189 Although not directly responsible 
for embedding these organisations illustrate the role information played in planning for the 
Iraq War, indeed, Clarke, was present at most OGC meetings.
190
 On the ground the policy 
would be implemented by the DoD, Pentagon and MoD.
191
 
However, differences existed between American and British implementation of embedding. 
Firstly, British attempts at war planning were hindered by pressure to reach diplomatic 
settlements to the crisis, this was less of a concern in the US were public support for war was 
higher.
192
 Secondly, the British embedding system utilised Forward Transmission Units 
where reports would be gathered, following a model similar to that of ‘pooling’, although less 
restrictive.
193
 This system was unpopular but illustrates that the British ‘had not quite grasped 
the principle’ behind embedding.194 
                                                          
184
 Payne, Kenneth, “The Media as an Instrument of War” Parameters, (Spring 2005) p. 86 
185
 Schechter, “Selling the Iraq War” p. 27 
186
 Brookes et al. Shoot First and Ask Questions Later, p. 23 
187
 Ibid. 
188
 Gough, LTC Susan L. “The Evolution of Strategic Influence” p. 29 
189
 Rampton & Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception,  p. 39 
190
 Ibid. 
191
 Brookes et al. Shoot First and Ask Questions Later, p. 15 
192
 Ibid. p. 60 
193
 Ibid.  p. 66 
194
 Ibid. p. 88 
Mark Newton Strategic News Management in the Iraq War 119000209 
35 
 
The official DoD statement concerning embedding claimed: 
“Media coverage of any future operation will, to a large extent, shape public perception of the 
national security environment now and in the years ahead. This holds true for the US public; 
the public in allied countries whose opinion can affect the durability of our coalition; and 
publics in countries where we conduct operations, whose perception of us can affect the cost 
and duration of our involvement. Our ultimate strategic success... will come in our long-term 
commitment to supporting our democratic ideals. We need to tell the factual story - good or 
bad - before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions...”195  
Another cited reason was a desire to show the professionalism of Coalition forces, as Clarke 
stated: “The strategy was pretty simple - if good things are happening, you want people to see 
it. And I knew that if people could see, both in the U.S. and abroad, the men and women of 
our U.S. military, they would be impressed...”196 British sources gave similar reasons, 
including a desire to counter enemy propaganda.
197
 Rid claims this counter-information 
element, as opposed to public ‘political education’, was the main rationale that “sold the 
program within the DoD.”198 
Additional justifications concerned journalistic needs and safety, stating that embedding 
would provide what journalists required, while improving military-media relations and 
keeping them safer.
199
 
200
 The murder of Daniel Pearl in Pakistan in 2002 had alerted media 
organisations to the dangers of asymmetrical conflicts, therefore encouraging their 
embedment.
201
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Critics have claimed that embedding was adopted for ulterior motives, namely the co-option 
and ‘pacification’ of journalists in order to produce positive reporting. The argument claims 
that journalists who spend time with troops would invariably become biased and ‘seduced’ 
into military lifestyle.
202
 As Carruthers explains: “In short, civilian attitudes and values were 
over-ridden by a new ‘social world’ in which military norms predominated. The re-orientated 
journalists accepted matter-of-factly, as the reality of war, acts which in civilian life they 
might have found unconscionable.”203 This phenomenon is a common contentious issue 
within journalism, especially in relation to ‘beat’ journalists who cover specific areas, such as 
crime or politics. Interaction with the same sources creates relationships and could lead to the 
socialisation of the journalist into occupational cultures where their ‘understandings and 
values coheres with that of their sources, therefore resulting in biased reporting.
 204
 In war, 
journalists act as ‘surrogates’ for civilians, their socialisation may lead to them viewing 
situations differently, even subconsciously, than civilians, resulting in subjectivity.
205
  
Objectivity has long been a cornerstone of journalism and is characterised by neutral 
reporting devoid of personal values. Objective style is defined by impersonal reporting of 
information and should almost always use the third-person to remove the reporters’ 
interpretations.
206
 Fox and Park conducted a study of CNN’s coverage of the Iraq War to 
investigate whether embedding resulted in increased use in first-person pronouns. 
Importantly, the use of collective pronouns, including ‘we’ and ‘us’, suggests the journalist 
has identified with their accompanying units by including themselves within the collective. 
The use of ‘I’ suggests the journalist has placed themselves within the story, therefore turning 
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into the ‘subject’ and no longer remaining an impersonal observer.207 Their study concluded 
embedded journalists were more likely to use first-person pronouns.
208
 On average they used 
‘I’ 3.55 times per story, compared to 0.93 times for non-embedded.209 The use of inclusive 
pronouns - ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘ours’ - was higher for embeds, who used it 0.39 times per story, 
compared to zero mentions in non-embeds.
210
 Fox and Park claim these results are significant 
and support claims that embedded journalists placed themselves centrally in the story and 
identified with troops. However, the study did not investigate the context of the use of ‘I’ in 
reports, which frequently was used to provide journalists’ locations or eye-witness reports.211 
Regardless, a single mention of ‘I’ would be sufficient, as in the case for non-embeds; its 
continued use suggests embeds were becoming central to their reports.
212
 An analysis 
conducted by the Project for Excellence in Journalism broadly supported embedding, stating 
it provided more information than previous media-management policies. Yet, it identified 
that the “inevitable bias that comes with point of view is a risk journalists and viewers must 
beware of.” 213 Brookes et al.’s content analysis of embedded reporting within British 
television found that embeds reports were more balanced than studio reports. Embeds 
reported Iraqi reactions to the invasion in more balanced terms than studio anchors who 
prioritised reports of civilians welcoming Coalition troops.
214
 Furthermore, embeds were no 
more likely to suggest Iraq had WMDs (thereby promoting official justification for the war) 
than any other type of report.
215
  
                                                          
207
 Ibid. 
208
 Ibid. p. 48 
209
 Ibid. p. 45 
210
 Ibid. pp. 45-47 
211
 Ibid. p. 46 
212
 Ibid. pp. 47/48 
213
 Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “Embedded Reporters: What Are Americans 
Getting?” 
214
 Brookes et al. Shoot First and Ask Questions Later, p. 124 
215
 Ibid. pp. 121/122 
Mark Newton Strategic News Management in the Iraq War 119000209 
38 
 
Qualitative assessments, however, may provide evidence of embeds identifying with troops. 
Interviews conducted by Brookes et al. show that all their journalist respondents expressed 
awareness of the issue.
216
 Several such as Ben Brown, Gavin Hewitt and Clive Myrie also 
state there were occasions when they felt uncomfortably close to the soldiers, often in combat 
situations. Brown stated that after being saved from an Iraqi sniper by British troops it: 
 “…was the closest I felt to being almost too close to the troops, because me and my cameramen 
both felt a sense of elation that this guy was dead, which is something I’ve never felt before...”217  
Other journalists expressed similar emotions, particularly in relation to their attitudes towards 
Iraqi soldiers.
218
 Knightly claims embedding lead to a loss of distinction between warrior and 
correspondent; several anecdotes appear to support this.
219
 In particular, Hewitt located and 
pointed out an approaching truck to US forces, who promptly fired upon it.
220
 The truck was 
filled with munitions; however the incident highlights the issue of soldiers and journalists 
sharing mutual security, with only the most professional (and arguably illogical) journalists 
placing detachment over personal safety, as Chris Ayres stated: “Of course, I was hardly 
objective... my chances of avoiding death at the hands of suicide bombers were directly 
linked to the Marines’ ability to kill the enemy.”221 However, identification may not have 
been with the war effort generally, but more explicitly with troops.
222
  
Although such statements by journalists are relatively common, they are at best anecdotal, 
especially considering the scale of embedding. They also illustrate that journalists were aware 
of the issues and could therefore mitigate their effect in actual reporting. Both the studies of 
Brookes et al. and Aday et al. conclude that although identification did occur, it did not affect 
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the objectivity of reports;
223
 
224
 although Brookes et al. claim US coverage was more biased 
than British.
225
 Indeed, one particularly controversial story, the US shooting of civilians at a 
checkpoint, was reported by an embed and contradicted official statements.
226
 Furthermore, 
Fox and Park suggest that use of the first-person does not necessarily result in subjectivity, or 
alternatively that the using the third-person ensures objectivity. Reporters’ reliance on 
sources means they are communicating subjective interpretations, therefore detached writing 
styles do not ensure objectivity, essentially: “... embedded reporters who relayed firsthand 
observations may actually have been more objective than nonembedded reporters who relied 
more on others’ interpretations of events.” 227 Ultimately, it is inaccurate to claim journalists 
were co-opted - identification and relationships occurred - but there is no clear evidence they 
affected the objectivity of reporting, indeed, anchor reports in studios adhered to the 
government line closer than embeds.
228
 Embeds may have held sympathy for troops they 
accompanied, but that does not necessarily translate into support for the administration. 
Therefore, claims that embeds, due to identification, consisted government ‘propagandists’229 
cannot be maintained.  Although stating PA planners accepted a ‘Stockholm syndrome’ may 
develop, Rid claims this was not central to planning, instead it was a “speculative, soft and 
insufficiently reliable” prediction.230 
Another criticism of embedding was its inability to convey an accurate picture of the entire 
war, due to its emphasis on combat and tactical information. Reporting was rarely limited by 
any official, or semi-official, censorship, indeed many journalists were surprised about the 
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amount of information they received.
231
 The only major attempt at censorship occurred when 
a commander of a failed operation attempted to forbid an embed from reporting what had 
occurred.
232
 However, this episode is significant precisely because such occurrences were 
almost universally rare.
233
 Those who were censored claimed it was often for justified reasons 
of operational security.
234
 Miller, however, claims this is tantamount to censorship, stating 
that the list of what journalists could report was shorter than the list of restrictions, suggesting 
autonomy was exchanged for security.
235
 Nonetheless journalists generally willingly accepted 
such limitations, especially when they may be harmed through violations of guidelines.
236
 
237
 
The restriction on journalists’ movement, however, could be considered censorship, as Alex 
Thomson stated: “I am still amazed by people who will tell you that they weren’t censored. 
Censorship is restricting someone’s freedom of movement as much as it is restricting what 
someone can and cannot film.”238 The military could restrict access to negative areas, such as 
towns with civilian casualties, while facilitating travel to positive areas, such as suspected 
terrorist camps.
239
 
Information cannot be limited merely by censorship, but also by the nature of reporting. 
Much of the information reported by embeds was of a narrow nature, leading to Laity terming 
it ‘narrow-casting’ as opposed to ‘broadcasting’.240 Rid agrees stating embedding resulted in 
‘soda-straw’ views “rich in human and tactical detail but poor in abstract and strategic 
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oversight”.241 The PEJ study support these claims, suggesting 94% of embedded reports were 
primarily factual, while 47% covered military actions.
242
 Furthermore, embeds often provided 
‘day-in-the-life’ reports or reported on how to conduct military tasks.243 Although perhaps 
interesting to the uninitiated, they failed to provide opportunity for critical discourse on the 
war.
244
 This dynamic could have been part of deliberate plans to distract reporting from more 
controversial issues, indeed Bryan Whitman of the Pentagon expressed awareness, stating: 
“The press pay for [close access], of course, because it is very deep, rich coverage, but it’s 
not very broad.”245 Some media outlets, especially American, stated this coverage could 
benefit the public, CNN anchor Bill Hemmer claimed: “To have journalists in with these 
Marines and tell us first hand... that the Marines are hunkered down in bunkers wearing gas 
masks and chemical suits... that is priceless information... it’s given our viewers a tremendous 
vantage point...”246 Nonetheless, the coverage attracted some criticism, including from the 
British government, with Defence Minister Hoon stating that tactical information failed to 
convey the restraint and discrimination British forces were employing.
247
 For Brookes et al. 
the issue of limited perspectives is more important than those of journalistic impartiality, as it 
“…forced wider questions about the war into the background and made the moment of 
victory... the climax of the narrative.”248 
Embedding also acted to place a ‘human face’ on the war by concentrating coverage on 
soldiers.
249
 The Aday et al. study provides evidence, with Coalition soldiers being quoted in 
51.4%, and pictured in 83.2% of embedded reports, compared with only 33.8% and 65.6% in 
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non-embedded.
250
 This reflects journalistic trends developing throughout the 1990s, a PEJ 
study found that: “There was been a shift towards lifestyle, celebrity, entertainment and 
celebrity crime/scandal in the news and away from government and foreign affairs.”251 The 
number of such stories doubled from 1977 to 1997.
252
 This approach has been criticised for 
distracting attention away from the meta-issues of war by concentrating on the tactical 
level.
253
  Journalist David Shaw argues this type of coverage is desirable: “I see nothing 
wrong and a great deal right with real time television stories and pictures and next day 
newspaper accounts of individual battles and triumphs, tragedies and daily routines of 
individual soldiers.”254 Such coverage seemed to appear more frequently on US networks, 
perhaps due to higher levels of public support,
255
 and a different journalistic culture, which 
particularly after 9/11, favoured an attached style.
256
 The dynamic was aided by the tendency 
for US embeds to be placed with troops from their local area, such reporters often prioritised 
human interest reports and were generally the most supportive.
257
 Admiral McCreary 
explains this dynamic was sought by the military:  
“...we need the support of the American people for our troops - not for the issue… and what 
better way for people to understand that than to put the face of the troops as the face of the 
war... while you may or may not agree with the war, you really support them and them 
coming back alive.”258 
This concept of ‘human-interest’ stories could provide impetus for the ‘support the troops’ 
mentality adopted by media outlets. Even The Daily Mirror, an anti-war tabloid, felt 
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compelled to support troops during the invasion, with its editor Piers Morgan stating: “... I 
have never seen such a switch in public opinion... It’s entirely down to the natural sense in 
this country... that once a war starts… we must unequivocally support our boys and girls.”259 
Public opinion did dramatically change. Prior to the invasion 46% of Britons supported the 
action, this rose to 83% during the conflict, and dropped to 44% in September 2003.
260
 Of 
those who changed their opinion 61% stated it was due to a desire to support the troops.
261
 
This phenomenon may be particularly important to policy-makers as it greatly increased 
support for a controversial war. Furthermore, Stahl states it directs dissent away from the 
policy, by equating support for troops with support for the policy, resulting in a situation 
where it “relocates the decision to wage war from the air-conditioned Washington, DC, office 
to the tent in the desert.”262 Opposition towards the policy also suggested opposition towards 
the troops, effectively silencing anti-war sentiment.
263
 
Therefore, the media, during the invasion, rarely questioned the wars justification, but 
prioritised the military advance, providing little contextualisation of this into a wider 
narrative.
264
 Such actions helped to preserve and protect public will from controversial issues 
that could affect support levels. Moreover, success in the war politically was increasingly 
associated with success militarily, indeed journalist Andrew Marr claimed that, following the 
capture of Baghdad, Tony Blair has been ‘proven right’ and ‘vindicated’, despite no evidence 
of WMDs.
265
 Hoskins claims that embedding, which encouraged such reporting, had resulted 
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in the Pentagon “planting spokesmen and women... all over the battlefield.”266 Importantly, 
for the conclusion however, is that the media’s hand was not forced in this regard. They were 
not overtly pressurised by the military to prioritise what they had. There were often media 
assets - unilateral journalists, experts, Baghdad reporters - who could have contextualised 
reports, however, it seems that these were underused in favour of exciting footage. 
This development is relatable to claims that Western war increasingly resembles ‘spectator-
sport’ or entertainment for a population which has little invested in modern conflict. McInnes 
argues that Western populations “...sympathise but do not suffer, they emphasise but do not 
experience...”267 For scholars of ‘spectator war’, the media plays a central role, Ignatieff 
claims it becomes a “decisive theatre of operations”,268 McInnes states it acts as the “window 
on the world” through which the West are provided information.269 The media is effective in 
defining the perception of warfare since its activities are commonly seen as being pursued 
with objectivity - which McInnes claims is not always certain.
270
 Stahl argues ‘militainment’ 
fully arrived in Western media during the Iraq War. Far from trying to convince the audience 
to any political direction, they were merely asked to watch conflict; to the extent they become 
“submissive, politically disconnected, complacent and deactivated.”271 This differs from 
traditional propaganda which suggests ‘why we fight’, militainment instead communicates 
‘that we fight’ to the expense of wider political discourse.272 Features of Iraq War news 
coverage which exemplify this include the use of entertainment formats, computer generated 
graphics, footage of missile strikes and satellite images, ‘chat-show’ commentary, 
entertainment journalists and female anchors selected for their appearance.
273
 
274
 Rampton 
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and Stauber highlight Fox News’ The O’Reilly Factor as evidence of this, stating that 
O’Reilly’s confrontational approach does not generate discussion but acts as entertainment, 
akin to watching WWE Wrestling.
275
 Several times during the war commentators expressed a 
similarity to sport: one executive described coverage as “extraordinary - it almost feels like 
World Cup football...”276 while former Wrestler-turned-expert-commentator, Jesse Ventura 
stated “It reminds me a lot of the Super Bowl.”277 Presenting war as entertainment can also 
act to sanitise it, despite the proximity to combat, graphic images showing casualties were 
rare on Western media.
278
 21% of embedded reports showed fired weapons, however none 
contained images of people being hit.
279
 Stahl claims by sanitising the war it becomes 
palatable to be consumed by spectators.
280
 This relates to concerns that graphic imagery can 
diminish public support, and can result in casualties, both friendly and enemy, becoming 
‘invisible’.281 The controversy following Al Jazeera’s showing of dead American soldiers 
illustrates the unwillingness of Coalition administrators to allow friendly casualties to be 
shown.
282
 Commercial networks may prevent showing such images for fears it will impact 
upon their ratings.
283
 Viewers surveyed after the Gulf War stated their main reasons for a 
disdain of graphic images were fears it will upset children, combined with a dislike of seeing 
corpses.
284
 Therefore, journalists may be censoring themselves by omitting to record events 
which they know will not receive airtime.
285
 Brookes et al. concluded: “It seems acceptable to 
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display those at the tip of the spear, but only in the professional way in which the spear is 
held, not the direct effect to which the spear is put...”286 
Associated with concepts of militainment, is ‘techno-fetishism’, whereby media coverage 
becomes overly concerned with military hardware, with technical discussion overriding 
broader issues of the war.
287
 Images of armaments featured in news graphics,
288
 while CNN’s 
website featured full information of weapons used by the Coalition, complete with 3D models 
and bombing animations (figure 2).
289
  
Figure 2 - Armament information and 3D Models on CNN.com 
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This section, featured more prominently on CNN’s ‘War in Iraq Main Page’ than sections 
concerning the invasion’s impact.290 Stahl claims the use of bomb-mounted cameras and 
‘weapon-view footage’ allows us to form first-person relationships with weapons and feel 
‘deputised’ into conflict.291 Embedding, which allowed journalists to be near equipment, 
aided this adoption of techno-fetishism. 
Again, this highlights how the spectacle of combat overrode the wider issues - what happened 
superseded why it happened. This allows the emphasis to move away from the point of policy 
creation, to the point of execution.
292
 
The development of these issues is relatable to the commercial imperatives of network 
television news. With competition in the media landscape increasing, news media has been 
forced to adopt ‘infotainment’ in order to attract audiences.293 Indeed, many US news 
networks are owned by entertainment conglomerates, such as AOL-Time Warner, Disney and 
Viacom.
294
 The development of media-entertainment-complexes during Regan-era 
deregulation allowed for absorption of smaller, independent outlets, resulting in the 
homogenisation of competing perspectives.
295
 During the Iraq War, a jingoistic perspective 
became the most lucrative, especially for US networks.
296
 The success of Fox, the most 
overtly patriotic network, is evidence for this. This generated a so-called ‘Fox effect’ by 
which other broadcasters moved their coverage closer to Fox’s style in order to generate 
revenue.
 297
 This may not be limited to the US; a major reason for The Mirror altering its anti-
war position was due to declining circulation.
298
 This resulted in a situation where negative 
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coverage was deemed ‘unpatriotic’ and therefore unprofitable. Embedding provided the 
media outlets with exciting footage which fitted into their infotainment formats. This was 
further supported by the activities of non-governmental pressure groups, such as conservative 
media-watchdog, the Media Research Center, and websites such as FreeRepublic.com, who 
criticised any liberal or critical media, as MSNBC President Erik Sorenson stated: “Any 
misstep and you get into trouble with these guys and have the Patriotism Police hunt you 
down.” 299 
The nature of 24/7 news channels also aided these developments. 70% of Americans received 
their news from 24 hour formats, making the concept more lucrative and competitive.
300
 
Rolling news requires constant information to maintain its attractiveness, Laity claims this 
imperative to ‘feed the beast’ results in hasty judgements and speculation, diminishing news 
credibility.
301
 Following the Iraq War, controversy surrounded reporting concerning the fall 
of Umm Qasr and Basra to Coalition troops, both were said to have been secured multiple 
times, often to be refuted later.
302
 Some criticised this as government deception, yet a more 
likely explanation is the pressure to be the first to release breaking news in 24/7 news 
competition.
303
 The speed with which information is processed means it is often done so 
without considerable fact-checking, resulting in inaccuracies.
304
 Embedding was ideal for 
rolling news, its proximity to the frontline resulted in masses of information, while also 
appealing to the tendency of 24/7 news to ‘go live’ to events.305 This type of reporting 
sacrifices contextual discussion, as the spectacle of the immediacy overrides broader 
issues.
306
 Embedding meant media outlets were saturated with information leading to the de-
                                                          
299
 Soreson, Erik quoted in Rampton & Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception,  pp. 166/167 
300
 Sharkey, Jacqueline E, “The Television War” American Journalism Review, (May 2003) 
301
 Laity, “Straddling the Divide - Spinning for Both Sides” p. 283 
302
 Brookes et al. Shoot First and Ask Questions Later, pp. 77-80 
303
 Ibid. p. 78 
304
 Lynch, “Reporting Iraq - what went right? what went wrong?” p. 119 
305
 Thussu, “Live TV and Bloodless Deaths” p. 120 
306
 Ibid. p. 120 
Mark Newton Strategic News Management in the Iraq War 119000209 
49 
 
prioritisation of strategic and political issues of the war. Furthermore, the media no longer 
had to look towards foreign media for stories to fill air time.
307
 Rampton and Stauber claim 
the result of this was that people knew less about conflict, a study conducted following the 
Gulf War revealed that the more TV news a person watched, the less likely they were to 
know about wider issues and the more likely they were to support the war.
308
  
Fundamentally, embedding provided the material essential to the media’s commercial and 
infotainment priorities. The result of this was a lack in contextual discussion, relegating wider 
issues about justification for war to the periphery. One important question for the conclusion 
is whether Coalition policy-makers predicted these outcomes and set to deliberately elicit 
them. Ideas regarding journalists identifying with troops have previously existed, especially 
following the Falkland and Gulf Wars.
309
 Brian Cullin, Director of Communication Planning 
and Integration, stated: “I knew that would come out of it, the whole Stockholm-syndrome 
type of thing.”310 However, this element seemed of secondary importance to providing a 
spectacle to distract the media. It should be stated that this appears to be a mostly American 
endeavour, with the reporting attracting criticism in Britain, for example Colonel Brook of 
the MoD’s Media Operations stated: “The American approach was simply the provision of an 
ability to spectate. And they were completely satisfied with simply providing the 
spectacle.”311 
This statement suggests this element of the media management policy was not openly 
discussed in the Coalition. Indeed, British commanders instigated measures, such as the 
Forward Transmission Units, which hindered the saturation of news studios.
312
 It is possible 
that through the use of PR and media specialists the US gained an enlightened understanding 
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of media commercialism and priorities. Embedding allowed for media outlets to engorge 
themselves on information which appealed to these priorities, simultaneously allowing the 
military to establish the prime narratives. 
Strategic oversight was to be provided by briefings at the CENTCOM media centre in 
Qatar.
313
 This initiative however, was met with frustration by journalists who felt it provided 
little information.
314
 CENTCOM briefings are widely accused of failing to provide strategic 
oversight, leading networks to utilise embeds to fill vacant airtime.
315
 There is evidence to 
suggest this was deliberately sought by the US, journalist Michael Massing claimed 
CENTCOM was designed to be “as annoying and inconvenient as possible for reporters”,316 
while Clarke accepts that CENTCOM was designed as secondary to embedding.
317
 General 
Frank’s director of communications stated: “Qatar was never designed to be the font of all 
news; the font of all news was designed to be the front line and their embeds and it worked 
out. We couldn’t be happier.”318 It seems the British were not included in this approach; they 
were also dissatisfied with CENTCOM. Media blackouts and US evasiveness to questions 
often bewildered MoD officers, with Colonel Brook stating the US “pretty much lost the war 
when it came to media support.”319 
Following operations in Iraq, journalists began calling for improved military briefing 
operations, a concept that was previously viewed with disdain. For example, journalist David 
Bartlett, after the Gulf War, proposed that “a well-briefed war is almost automatically a 
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poorly reported war and vice versa.”320 Following Iraq, journalists began to re-evaluate the 
value of close access to units, with some advocating for a more detached overview.
321
 
Reporting the Jessica Lynch and Firdos Square Incidents 
The issues which emerged from embedding will be examined in relation to two major events 
of the Iraq War: The rescue of Jessica Lynch and the toppling of the Firdos Square statue. 
The rescue of Jessica Lynch has been particularly controversial and resulted in a House of 
Representatives investigation entitled ‘Misleading Information from the Battlefield: The 
Tillman and Lynch Episodes’.322  Lynch, a US supply clerk, was taken prisoner on 23 March, 
and following her rescue on 1 April, received significant media attention. Despite initially 
accurate reports, later reports emerged stating she fought fiercely against the enemy. The 
Washington Post on 3 April reported Lynch:  
“...fought fiercely and shot several enemy soldiers... firing her weapon until she ran out of 
ammunition, U.S. officials said yesterday. Lynch... continued firing at the Iraqis even after 
she sustained multiple gunshot wounds and watched several other soldiers in her unit die 
around her...”
 323
 
Other publications reported similarly,
324
 some claiming she was tortured by ‘Fedayeen’ after 
her capture.
325
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Her rescue was filmed by a ‘combat camera’ crew and was similarly described as heroic.326 
The supposed heroism of Lynch and her rescuers was soon developed into several 
documentaries and a TV movie developed in conjunction with the Pentagon.
327
 
Later details emerged which contradicted the original statements from unnamed ‘official 
sources’. Far from fighting ‘fiercely’ Lynch testified to the investigation that she was 
knocked unconscious immediately, sustaining only road accident injuries.
328
 The rescue was 
also stated to be overly dramatic, and arguably unnecessary. The hospital was later found to 
be abandoned of military personnel, furthermore, it emerged that Iraqi hospital staff had 
attempted to return Lynch to American lines, but where fired upon.
329
 This has led some to 
speculate that details of Lynch episode were fabricated to develop a positive story during a 
period of negative press. Casualties had been mounting, while a lack of WMD evidence and 
slow-downing of the invasion had led to speculation that it was becoming ‘bogged-down’.330 
Kumar concludes that: “In this context, the “daring” and “dramatic” rescue of Lynch, as the 
media would describe it, served to deflect attention from the difficulties and to win support 
for the war effort.”331 Harindranath claims that the dramatic nature of the episode appealed to 
“American psyche through its use of the Hollywood argot”. A doctor at the hospital stated: 
“It was like a Hollywood film. They cried “Go, go, go”, with guns and blanks and the sound 
of explosions. They made a show - an action movie like Sylvester Stallone or Jackie Chan, 
with jumping and shouting, breaking open doors...”332 
Chairman of the investigation, Henry Waxman stated US officials had become the source of a 
story which “riveted the nation, but twisted the truth beyond recognition”.333 He stated that 
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the rescue had, in fact, been delayed to make necessary filming and press preparations.
334
 The 
presentation of the rescue as non-fictional, as well as news and documentary reporting, made 
the fabricated version of events more resilient, as these mediums are assumed to be ‘mimetic’ 
of reality, as opposed to drama’s ‘diegetic’ nature.335 This combination with Hollywood 
themes makes the narrative even more attractive to audiences and media outlets.
336
 Lynch 
herself was a perfect subject for this narrative, as an attractive, blonde 19 year old; she could 
be framed as a ‘damsel-in-distress’ to be rescued by masculine heroes.337 Additionally, her 
rescue worked to frame the US as an enlightened nation compared to an Iraqi regime which 
abuses women.
338
  
It is debatable whether the military manipulated the media to this conclusion, as Waxman 
stated; it is unclear whether the fabrications resulted from “incompetence or deliberate 
strategy.”339 US officials responsible for ‘dramatic’ reports stated they never knowingly gave 
false information. Admiral Thorpe stated he took information from the press, and “things that 
[he’d] heard” before relaying it to the media, with these reports then being attributed to 
officials.
340
 Misinformation may have resulted from persistent rumours, attributed to officials, 
which gained credibility through their pervasiveness. Thorpe stated that in the rapid nature of 
media environments, he was unable to accurately know the truth.
341
 Moorcraft concludes 
along similar lines, stating the media “…were to blame for the initial hype, not the military, 
though they did little to counter the flag-waving around the saving of Private 
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Lynch.”342Regardless, the information must have been produced by military sources, 
deliberately or mistakenly, as they held the monopoly on information in this instance, while 
the story was allowed to permeate through the media by officials who favoured ‘heroic’ 
interpretations. The ‘Hollywood’ rescue capitalised on this, with one CENTCOM officer 
claiming: “We knew it would be the hottest thing of the day, there was not an intent to talk it 
down or embellish it, because we didn’t need to. It was an awesome story.”343  Therefore, 
Lynch’s rescue contained similar themes as embedding, providing a dramatic, ‘quasi-live’, 
human interest war story. The US administration acted to prioritise ‘cinematic’ narratives, not 
controlling the media, but permitting it to report extensively.  
The toppling of the Firdos Square Saddam Hussein statue is commonly defined as the most 
enduring image of the conflict. 80% of respondents interviewed by Brookes et al. 
remembered it “very well”.344 On 9 April, an apparent group of Iraqis attempted to topple the 
statue, their efforts were aided by US troops utilising a recovery vehicle to destroy the 
statue.
345
 The event arguably provided the Coalition’s ‘victory-moment’, despite the 
continuation of combat operations.
346
 However, journalist Robert Fisk claims it was “...the 
most staged photo-opportunity since Iwo Jima.”347 Indeed, Firdos Square was located outside 
the base for many journalists.
348
 
Media organisations immediately framed the footage as significant; describing it as 
‘momentous’, ‘overwhelming’, and ‘ecstatic’.349 It was increasingly framed relative to 
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historically significant televised events, namely the fall of the Berlin Wall.
350
 Aday et al. 
claim that historical analogies are commonplace, stating that “canonical images” reflect a 
need for “symbolic catharsis” with powerful news images “evok[ing] primary cultural 
themes”.351 They claim such images are often synthetic in nature, and prioritise drama.352 
Further to providing a ‘victory moment’ and the physical manifestation of the defeat of the 
enemy, it also provided a ‘liberation moment’, and helped to confirm Coalition claims that 
Iraqis clamoured for freedom. This claim was often made with historical analogies; The Daily 
Telegraph reported: “This joyous moment calls the deposition of scores of statues of Lenin 
all over eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War.”353 Outlets noted scenes of “jubilant 
Iraqis”, “crowds cheering” and “greeting [US troops] as liberators”.354 
The pervasiveness of these frames is illustrated by the fact that following the event journalists 
began returning home.
355
 The number of stories regarding the war similarly dropped as 
shown in Figure 3:  
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Moorcraft and Taylor claim, the collapse of the statue provided the media with their ‘exit 
strategy’, which became important as embedding increased in expense.356  As such, there was 
less media presence in post-conflict stages, where Coalition casualties were in fact higher.
357
 
Several journalists have stated that the reality of the event was different from that shown, 
with the crowd being relatively small and the event garnering only minor local attention.
358
  
Kellner states that much of the crowd was journalists or members of the INC which had been 
previously flown into Baghdad.
359
  Evidence emerged that the event, although started by 
Iraqis, was seized upon by PSYOP officers. Staff Sergeant Plesich recalled that a colonel 
“saw the Saddam statue as a target of opportunity and decided that the statue must come 
down”, adding: 
“We looked over and now there was an American flag draped over the face of the statue. God 
bless them, but we were thinking from PSYOP school that this was just bad news. We didn’t 
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want to look like an occupation force, and some of the Iraqis were saying, `No, we want an 
Iraqi flag!’ So I said `No problem, somebody get me an Iraqi flag.’ I am not sure where it 
came from, but one of the Iraqis brought us the old Iraqi flag... We got that as fast as we could 
and started running that up to the statue.”360 
For Miller this highlighted that PSYOP officers “spend at least some of their time 
managing… domestic opinion”.361 Global Focus.org similarly states: “It would be impossible 
to claim that the staged toppling of Saddam’s statue was not intended for international 
audiences, including the US.”362 Therefore, the incident provides evidence that PSYOP has 
targeted US audiences; however this event may be exceptional. Plesich’s statement appears to 
prioritise the opinion of Iraqis, not global or domestic opinion, furthermore, he belonged to a 
Tactical Psychological Operations Team, a unit designed for military PSYOP, not strategic 
media-management; therefore their actions may have been spontaneous. 
Indeed, the media were responsible for the presentation of the event, not the military or 
administration. Media organisations elected to make analogies with historical events, 
prioritising tight, close-shots, which made the crowds look larger, as opposed to wide-shots 
which illustrated the emptiness of the square. Wide-shots were not used in any British 
evening news reports.
 
Brookes et al. concludes: “In short, images were chosen for their drama 
rather than their accuracy.” 363  Editorial control is important in this regard, as they appeared 
to highlight images of celebratory Iraqis, Brookes et al. claims such images constituted ‘goal’ 
pictures and illustrates how “journalistic judgement contains clear ideological 
assumptions”.364 However, the media could have been responding to government claims that 
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Coalition troops would be met as liberators. Administration officials prepared the press for 
‘liberation scenes’, when these appeared to materialise, the media were already predisposed 
to follow government claims.
365
 
This incident highlights the trend for the modern media to seek spectacles - the toppling of 
the statue appeared to provide an almost filmic ending to the war, a moment of jubilation, 
complete with symbolic destruction of the enemy. Therefore, it fits into the narrative 
produced by other elements of Coalition media policy. 
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Chapter 3: The Implications of Military Media-Management 
“We expect every American to support our military, and if they can’t do that, to shut up.” - 
Bill O’Reilly, Fox News Channel366 
The Legitimacy of Western Propaganda Use 
The above illustrates how the military utilised the media to benefit IO and PSYOP 
capabilities. They developed a programme which distracted media outlets away from meta-
analysis of the war, while reducing their dependency on foreign information sources. 
Embedding was prioritised by a media moving towards infotainment, especially in the US. 
The Coalition gained information dominance and protected the COG of public opinion by 
enthralling the media with spectacles. The military rarely lied, instead presenting alternative 
‘truths’, while repressing others. During the Lynch episode, they allowed ‘heroic’ versions to 
dominate, despite the presence of alternative ‘truths’, the same can be seen in a Baghdad 
market bombing on 29 March. Fisk identified wreckage which he claimed stated a US missile 
was responsible, the Coalition stated the explosion could have resulted from a malfunctioning 
Iraqi surface-to-air missile.
367
 Whatever the actual truth, the Coalition prioritised a ‘potential 
truth’, which a media, conditioned by government claims regarding Iraqi inferiority and 
Coalition precision, may have more readily reported. However, the use of ‘spin’ in this way, 
at least constitutes manipulation, and potentially propaganda. 
Therefore should propaganda, or media/information manipulation, be a legitimate strategic 
tool for democracies? Such terms garner negativity in the West; they are seen as incompatible 
with open democracy, and are associated with authoritarian regimes.
368
 Schmidt, however, 
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states such activities are not vastly different from political or marketing campaigns, arguing: 
“If the Republican and Democratic National Committees, Coca-Cola, Nike, and McDonald’s 
can do it, why can’t our government use the same successful methods to target many of the 
same audiences?”369  
The increasing role of information warfare makes this particularly critical; especially as 
media support is not guaranteed in asymmetric ‘New Wars’.370 Therefore, some commanders 
have advocated for domestic propaganda use, if it wins wars. Admiral Lewin, following the 
Falklands War, stated:  
“I do not see it as deceiving the press or the public: I see it as deceiving the enemy. What I am 
trying to do is win. Anything I can do to help me win is fair as far as I am concerned.”371  
Taylor argues that ‘propaganda’ is a value-neutral term, claiming such techniques could be 
used for good: “If the intention is to promote democratic values... then democracies need not 
fight shy from the word.” 372 For example, if the West conducted more robust information 
campaigns against public opinion in 1994, they may have secured an intervention during the 
Rwandan Genocide. 
In modern conflicts, not utilising propaganda may disadvantage the West. Modern 
communication and media environments can allow poorly equipped enemies to have strategic 
influence.
373
 Gough states the real surprise is that the West’s enemies are effective, given the 
West’s expertise in psychology and communications.374 Martemucci claims that in ‘Long 
War’ these factors favour the enemy; therefore, by not utilising PSYOP or IO domestically, 
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the West may be hindering its ability to combat 21st century adversaries.
375
 Clausewitz stated 
that moderation in warfare would “lead to logical absurdity”, advocating the expenditure of 
maximum effort by combining ‘total means’ and ‘strength of will’.376. Martemucci argues 
that post-9/11 conflicts are ‘wars of ideas’ and it is therefore “imperative that the “National 
Will” be effectively communicated to all audiences through a cohesive Perception 
Management campaign.”377 Not to do so results in Clausewitz’s absurdity. Stahl argues this 
dynamic results in citizens no longer being the subject of the military, as in the citizen-soldier, 
but the object of military interest - constituting a ‘battle space’ to be ‘micro-managed.’378 
Strict adherence to democratic principles could be disadvantageous in conflicts, furthermore, 
an unchecked media could prolong warfare, Lord explains the media accepts it cannot 
endanger lives but “they do not recognise an obligation to refrain from publicising 
information that demoralises American troops, reveals aspects of American intelligence or 
military planning, undermines American diplomatic initiatives, or gives psychological 
comfort to the enemy.”379 Such reporting reduces military efficiency, increasing casualties 
and conflict duration. 
The media often see themselves as guardians of democratic principles. In interviews by 
Baroody, several journalists expressed the watchdog role of the press, in “auditing what is 
going on in the battlefield”, and exposing deception.380 War correspondents in particular, are 
more demanding when it comes to professional autonomy, while the ‘truth’ is often more 
critical in their work, than in other journalistic areas.
381
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However, does the public appreciate these values, or are they more willing to suspend these 
concepts during conflict? Broadcasters have claimed that the fallout from Vietnam identifies 
that the public similarly value their ‘right to know’.382 However, there is evidence to suggest 
that the public may tolerate reducing this right, even in limited conflicts. Following the 
Falklands War a Defence Committee concluded: 
“Many principles, supposedly regarded as sacred and absolute within the media, are applied in 
a less rigid and categorical way by the public... In our judgement the public is, in general, 
quite ready to tolerate being misled to some extent if the enemy is also misled, thereby 
contributing to the success of the campaign.”383 
Following the Falklands War, Morris and Tumber conducted audience research regarding 
their attitudes towards war reporting. Although concluding the ‘public did not wish for the 
“fourth estate” to become the “fourth service”’ - with three-quarters of respondents favouring 
‘reporting information even though it might reflect unfavourably on British troops’ - they 
also found areas of divergence. 49% thought such information should be reported after the 
war, with only 26% advocating for immediate publication. 34% approved of government 
public misinformation to aid the war effort, with 21% stating the media should facilitate 
this.
384
 Similar findings were gathered following the Gulf War; although 57% believed 
reporting should be objective, 27% thought it should emphasis a ‘British interpretation’.385 
These numbers, although the minority, are still significant, illustrating sections of the public 
will accept the temporary cessation of ‘democratic’ reporting in war. These results, however, 
could be related to the high levels of support in the Falkland and Gulf Wars.
386
 The Iraq War 
was much more controversial, especially in Britain, and viewers were less willing to accept 
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biased reporting. Surveys showed that 92% favoured impartial reporting, a number 
significantly higher than in previous conflicts.
387
 Nonetheless, the success of Fox in America 
perhaps illustrates that certain sectors of the US audience were less inclined towards unbiased 
reporting.
388
  
The above suggests that audiences may tolerate government deception, and biased reporting, 
if it aids the effort for popular wars. This tolerance quickly erodes if the war is perceived as 
controversial or unjustified.  Clausewitz recognised this, stating the maximum effort should 
be pursued within the confines set by policy, which in democracies represents public will. 
Clausewitz continued: “To turn this principle into practise [the commander] must renounce 
the need for absolute success in each given case…”389 Therefore, media-management is 
possible in circumstances where the national will is strong enough to support such ‘maximum 
efforts’, for example in total or popular wars, such as the Iraq War (in the US). However, 
once the national will, or public passion, contracts, as it did during the post-conflict stages, 
toleration for this ‘maximum expenditure’ wanes. This explains recent controversy 
surrounding military media-management which has emerged   
Conclusion 
The above suggests the media were not forcibly co-opted into IO or PSYOP. Nevertheless, 
despite little evidence of censorship, the media were still utilised for these functions. 
However, the nature of the manipulation had changed greatly - far from the media being a 
victim, they actually became complicit within manipulation. Essentially, the media-
management policy of the Iraq War allowed the media to ‘manipulate’ itself. 
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The use of PR firms within the military is critically important. These organisations, adept at 
operating in modern media environments, acted to dominate media coverage of the Iraq 
War.
390
 PR corporations helped promote a new attitude towards the media, which emphasised 
allowing and not restricting access. PR specialist, Kate Paine, claimed embedding constituted 
a tactic of “sheer genius”, calling it “a brilliant strategy and could well change the face of PR 
forever”.391 A central component was that the military learnt to appreciate reporters as 
humans, she states: “The lesson here is... treat reporters as human beings, train them, give 
them access, let them develop the relationships - and chances are good you’ll get your 
message across.”392 Instead of the military viewing the media as a homogenous and 
adversarial entity, they increasingly appreciated it as a diverse and malleable network, 
comprised of humans with which relationships could develop.  
However, the ‘relationship’ element appears to be secondary to concepts of distracting the 
media with exciting information. Once again this originates in a skilful modern media 
examination. Following interviews with Pentagon staff, Brookes et al. concluded it was 
“clear that the military and the government understands very well how the media works...”393 
Central figures, such as Alastair Campbell, were previously journalists and, therefore, have 
intimate knowledge of media practises.
394
 Campbell has been accused of using his experience 
to manipulate journalists, to the extent that ‘politics in Britain has become ‘packaged’ for the 
media’.395 Such practises were conducted so skilfully that it may have operated on 
subconscious levels. War-correspondent Chris Hedges concludes: “Perhaps this is not 
conscious. I doubt the journalists filing the hollow reports from Iraq, in which there are 
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images but rarely any content, are aware of how they are being manipulated.”396 Nonetheless, 
the US appears largely responsible for this, with British officers criticising the coverage. 
Brook recognises that embed reports were just “...too good. If you’re an editor and you’ve got 
the choice of running a gun battle in Al Nasiriya and a chap doing a briefing in Qatar, there is 
no contest, and that was extremely frustrating.”397 Britain never enjoyed as high support 
levels for the war as the Americans. In America, the administration may have been content to 
distract audiences from the strategic issues of the war, in Britain these issues were more 
persistent - embedding did not address this issue. 
Taverner claims the military understood the media would be present at future conflicts and 
they were therefore “a factor that has to be considered in all military planning.”398 He 
concludes the military recognised that “the media, like nature, abhors a vacuum.”399 
Information restriction in the modern media environment did not prevent negative reporting; 
instead the media could go elsewhere for information. By providing timely information the 
military can maintain dominance by ensuring their messages filled the vacuum. To retain 
restrictive policies would hand the initiative to other, possibly adversarial, sources. By 
engaging the media they would be most responsive to administration narratives. Brookes et al. 
claim this has less to do with “preventing negative coverage than creating positive 
coverage.”400 This dynamic provides a robust information strategy which can protect critical 
COGs. 
Embedding plays a critical role as it provided the most exciting information, developing the 
military advance as the dominant narrative. The Pentagon’s enthusiasm for the program 
                                                          
396
 Hedges, Chris quoted in Palmer & Tumber, Media at War, p. 61 
397
 Interview with Brook, COL Paul in Brookes et al. Shoot First and Ask Questions Later, p. 76 
398
 Taverner, LT COL, “Learning the Lessons of the 20th Century” p. 271 
399
 Ibid. p. 272 
400
 Brookes et al. Shoot First and Ask Questions Later, p. 195 
Mark Newton Strategic News Management in the Iraq War 119000209 
66 
 
illustrates that they favoured such narratives.
 401
 Military success was the least controversial 
issue prior to the conflict, most analysts expected the Coalition to be victorious. As a result, 
coverage of this issue would overlook more controversial subjects, such as Iraqi possession of 
WMDs and civilians’ welfare.402 Furthermore, the programme provided credibility by 
supporting military claims. General Myers statement during the war is fairly typical: “As 
you’ve seen from the TV coverage, from embedded media, clearly we’re moving towards our 
objectives.”403 
The Coalition provided the bait which lured the media into areas where positive messages 
predominated. As Paine stated, embedding was an “offer the media couldn’t resist”.404 Miller 
claims, it essentially made journalists “become advocates for the system of control”.405 
Therefore, the military bear some responsibility for manipulating the media. Although there 
were instances of PSYOP in domestic reporting, the Coalition’s policy was primarily driven 
by a public relations agenda, not an attempt to instigate formal domestic PSYOP. The media, 
attracted by promises of access were complicit within this.
406
 
The media must also assume some responsibility for this manipulation, especially for so 
eagerly taking the ‘bait’. Embedding was only successful because the media had already 
been adopting practises which precluded critical interpretation in favour of cheap news 
concerned with celebrity and action. As war-correspondent Martin Bell stated:  
“We like to see ourselves as bulwarks or beacons, standing in a principled way against 
censorship, manipulation and a variety of political pressures to shade the truth. Those are 
our enemies. But is it not possible that the real enemy lies in the hearts of journalists 
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themselves, in cynicism and unchecked ambition and a willingness to fool with the facts for 
the sake of a story?”407 
Brookes et al. conclude similarly, stating that the military’s program was successful “not 
because of any failure of normal media practises, but precisely because professional 
journalists were carrying on with business as usual.”408 
The military utilised the media through a detailed and enlightened examination of modern 
media practises. These examinations revealed media tendencies which were more easily 
manipulated, not through the information restriction, but through information saturation. The 
competitiveness of news networks, combined with an audience who are perceived as 
appreciating spectacle over education, resulted in a programme which provided the media 
with what they wanted to win audience share, at an expense of what they needed to inform 
audiences. 
However, can we expect the military to do anything else? They have the imperative to win at 
the lowest cost possible. In modern warfare, this requires engagement within the 
informational sphere. The media and negative public opinion can be seen as adversarial to 
strategy. As with any adversary, the military will desire to conquer it - this is the essence of 
strategy - the production of an asymmetry in your advantage,
409
 as one American colonel 
stated: “...part of our planning process was: how could we maximise the use of that press?”410  
During the Iraq War, this domination was achieved through proactive interaction with the 
media.
411
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This nature of strategy appears to have been misunderstood by many in the media. The fact 
most of the criticism for embedding resulted from veteran war-correspondents highlights the 
naivety of modern media practitioners in dealing with the military. Any military-media policy 
will always ‘weaponise’ the media, not to do so results in Clausewitz’s ‘absurdity’.  
However, wars, in a democratic society, are fought at the behest of the public as such their 
opinion must be a component of strategy, not merely as ‘friction’ but as the central feature of 
politics. Utilising the media in IO will only be effective in conflicts where the political and 
national will is strong enough to support such actions, i.e. in popular wars. Wars are made 
popular through government justification and reasoning; this popularity is maintained by 
military activities in war. This highlights an intimate link between the three branches of 
Clausewitz’s trinity. The role of the government in providing the basis for IO in Iraq must be 
stressed. The media-management policy of the military could only be successful because the 
preceding government campaign for justifying the war had seemingly, in the US, answered 
broader issues concerning the war. The less potent success of British media-management may 
be associated to lower support levels and lingering public doubts regarding justification. 
Clausewitz provides that ‘enmity’ is central to successful strategy.412 Indeed, he states 
“combat is an expression of hostile feelings”, this hatred, however, is not just required from 
combatants, but also from public will.
413
 In post-industrial war such hatred is short-coming. 
In these situations ‘war spectacles’ will not benefit information strategy since it would simply 
appear as ‘slaughter for slaughter’s sake’. For this dynamic to benefit strategy the spectating 
must be conducted within ‘hatred’ frameworks. It could be claimed that this ‘hatred’ was 
generated prior to the Iraq War through claims of Iraqi WMD possession and association with 
9/11. This generated the ‘enmity’ required, in the US, for successful IO operations, by 
providing context to the spectating of war. The nature of the spectating, in turn, prevented 
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these broader contexts from being re-examined by the public, therefore, preserving ‘hatred’ 
and protecting the Coalitions’ critical centre of gravity. 
Word Count, excluding bibliography, main title, contents, abstract and references: 14,996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mark Newton Strategic News Management in the Iraq War 119000209 
70 
 
Bibliography 
 
Aday, Sean, Cluverius, John & Livingston, Steven, “As Goes the Statue, So Goes the War: 
The Emergence of the Victory Frame in Television Coverage of the Iraq War” Journal of 
Broadcasting and Electronic Media, Vol. 49, Iss. 3, (2005) pp. 314-331 
Aday, Sean, Hebert, Maeve and Livingston, Steven, “Embedding the Truth: A Cross-Cultural 
Analysis of Objectivity and Television Coverage of the Iraq War” The International Journal 
of Press/Politics, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Winter 2005) pp. 3-21 
Allen, Patrick D. Information Operations Planning, (Boston: Artech House, 2007) 
Barnett, Frank R & Lord, Carnes (ed.) Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: 
Rethinking the US Approach, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press in 
cooperation with National Strategy Information Centre, 1989) 
Baroody, Judith Raine, Media Access and the Military: The Case of the Gulf War, (Lanham, 
Md: University Press of America, 1998) 
 
BBC News “Libya: What do the military operation names mean?” 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-12831743 (accessed 14/08/2012) 
 
Belknap, Margaret K. “The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?” Parametres 
(Autumn 2002) pp. 100-114 
 
Biressi, Anita & Nunn, Heather, (ed.) Mediaactive, issue 3: Mediawar, (London: Barefoot 
Publications, 2003) 
 
Bodi, Faisal, “Al Jazeera’s War” in Miller, David (ed.) Tell me lies: Propaganda and Media 
Distortion in the Attack on Iraq, (London: Pluto Press, 2004) 
Brookes, Rod, Lewis, Justin, Mosdell, Nick & Threadgold, Terry, Shoot First and Ask 
Questions Later: Media Coverage of the 2003 Iraq War, (New York: Peter Lang, 2006) 
 
Brookes, Rod and Lewis, Justin, “Reporting the War on British Television” in Miller, David 
(ed.) Tell me lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq, (London: Pluto 
Press, 2004) 
 
Brown, Robin, “Spinning the War: Political Communications, Information Operations and 
Public Diplomacy in the War on Terrorism” in Freedman, Des and Thussu, Daya Kishan, (ed.) 
War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7, (London: SAGE, 2003) 
 
Campbell, Vincent, Information Age Journalism: Journalism in an international context, 
(London: Arnold, 2004) 
 
Carruthers, Susan L, The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth 
Century, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) 
 
Mark Newton Strategic News Management in the Iraq War 119000209 
71 
 
von Clausewitz, Carl, trans. Howard, Michael & Peret, Peter, On War, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1989) 
 
CNN “War in Iraq Main Page’ http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/iraq/ (accessed 
27/8/2012) 
 
Connelly, Mark & Welch, David, War and the Media: Reportage and Propaganda, (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2005) 
 
Curtis, Mark, “Psychological Warfare Against the Public: Iraq and Beyond” in Miller, David 
(ed.) Tell me lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq, (London: Pluto 
Press, 2004) 
 
The Daily Telegraph “A day of joy for Iraq, a day of reckoning for tyrants” The Daily 
Telegraph, Telegraph View, (10 April 2003) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-
view/3589892/A-day-of-joy-for-Iraq-a-day-of-reckoning-for-tyrants.html (accessed 
22/8/2012) 
 
Darley, COL. William “Clausewitz’s Theory of War and Information Operations.” Joint 
Force Quarterly, iss. 40, (1st Quarter 2006) 
 
Elstad, MAJ. Peter L, “Overcoming Information Operations Legal Limitations in Support of 
Domestic Operations” U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, (2008) 
 
FAIR - Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting, “FAIR - MEDIA ADVISORY: Pentagon 
Propaganda Plan is Undemocratic, Possibly Illegal” http://www.fair.org/activism/osi-
propaganda.html (accessed 6/5/2012) 
 
Farrell, Stephen, “Embedistan” http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/embedistan-2/ 
(accessed 3/5/2012) 
Fox, Julia R. & Park, Byungho, “The “I” of Embedded Reporting: An Analysis of CNN 
Coverage of the “Shock and Awe” Campaign” Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 
Vol. 50, Iss. 1, (2006) pp. 36-51 
Freedman, Des, “The Daily Mirror and the war on Iraq” in Biressi, Anita & Nunn, Heather, 
(ed.) Mediaactive, issue 3: Mediawar, (London: Barefoot Publications, 2003) 
 
Freedman, Des and Thussu, Daya Kishan, (ed.) War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7, 
(London: SAGE, 2003) 
Garrison, COL. W.C. “Information Operations and Counter-Propaganda: Making a Weapon 
of Public Affairs” Army War College, Carlisle Barracks PA, (March 1999) 
 
Giffin, John & Winters, Jim “Information Dominance Point Paper” 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/info-dominance/id.htm (accessed 05/09/2012) 
 
Global Focus, “Information Operations & Psychological Operations in Iraq” 
http://www.globalfocus.org/GF-IOPO-Iraq.htm (accessed 17/5/2012) 
 
Mark Newton Strategic News Management in the Iraq War 119000209 
72 
 
Global Security, “On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/onpoint/ch-6.htm (accessed 
15/6/2012) 
Gough, LTC Susan L. “The Evolution of Strategic Influence” U.S. Army College, Carlisle 
Barracks, PA, (April 2003) 
Gowing, Nik, “Journalists and War: The Troubling New Tensions Post 9/11” in Freedman, 
Des and Thussu, Daya Kishan, (ed.) War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7, (London: 
SAGE, 2003) 
Harindranath, Ramaswami, “Battling over the ‘truth’“ in Biressi, Anita & Nunn, Heather, (ed.) 
Mediaactive, issue 3: Mediawar, (London: Barefoot Publications, 2003) 
 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Field Manual 3-61.1: Public Affairs Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures” http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/ 
fm3_61x1.pdf (accessed 23/6/2012) 
Hoskins, Andrew, Televising War: from Vietnam to Iraq, (London: Continuum, 2004) 
 
House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, “Misleading 
Information From the Battlefield: The Tillman and Lynch Episodes” 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-110hrpt858/html/CRPT-110hrpt858.htm (accessed 
25/8/2012) 
Ignatieff, Michael, Virtual War, (London, Chatto & Windus, 2000) 
 
Jesser, Peter & Young, Peter, The Media and the Military: From the Crimea to Desert Strike, 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997) 
 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations” (Washington 
D.C.: The Joint Staff, 2001) 
 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations” (Washington D.C.: 
The Joint Staff, 2006)  
 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-53: Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations” 
(Washington D.C.: The Joint Staff, 2003) 
 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-61: Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations” 
(Washington D.C.: The Joint Staff, 1997) 
 
Kamalipour, Yahya R. & Snow, Nancy, (ed.) War, Media, and Propaganda: A Global 
Perspective, (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004) 
Kellner, Douglas, The Persian Gulf TV War, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992) 
 
Mark Newton Strategic News Management in the Iraq War 119000209 
73 
 
Kellner, Douglas, “9/11, Spectacles of Terror, and Media Manipulation”, in Miller, David 
(ed.) Tell me lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq, (London: Pluto 
Press, 2004) 
 
Knightley, Phillip, “History or Bunkum?” British Journalism Review, Vol. 14 Iss. 2 (2003) 
pp. 7-14 
 
Knightly, Phillip, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker 
From the Crimea to Kosovo, (London: Prion Books Limited, 2001) 
 
Kumar, Deepa, “Media, War, and Propaganda: Strategies of Information Management During 
the 2003 Iraq War” Communications and Critical/Cultural Studies, Vol. 3. No. 1, (March 
2006), pp. 48-69 
 
Kumar, Deepa, “War Propaganda and the (Ab)Uses of Women: Media Constructions of the 
Jessica Lynch Story” Feminist Media Studies, Vol 4. No. 3, (2004) pp. 297-313 
 
Laity, Mark, “Afterword” in Connelly, Mark & Welch, David, War and the Media: 
Reportage and Propaganda, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005) 
Laity, Mark, “Straddling the Divide - Spinning for Both Sides” in Connelly, Mark & Welch, 
David, War and the Media: Reportage and Propaganda, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005) 
 
Loeb, Vernon & Schmidt, Susan. ‘She was Fighting to the Death’; Details Emerging of W. 
Va. Soldier’s Capture and Rescue” The Washington Post, (3 April 2003) 
 
Lord, Carnes “The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy” in Barnett, Frank R & 
Lord, Carnes (ed.) Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the US 
Approach, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press in cooperation with National 
Strategy Information Centre, 1989) 
 
Lowery, Alan (Director) & Pilger, John (Director/Writer) The War You Don’t See, 
(Dartmouth Films, 2010) 
 
Lynch, Jake, “Reporting Iraq - what went right? what went wrong?” in Biressi, Anita & Nunn, 
Heather, (ed.) Mediaactive, issue 3: Mediawar, (London: Barefoot Publications, 2003) 
 
Maltese, J. A. Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and the 
management of Presidential News, (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1994) 
 
Maniaty, Tony, “From Vietnam to Iraq: Negative trends in television war reporting” Pacific 
Journalism Review, Vol. 14. No. 2, (2008) pp. 89-101 
 
Martemucci, MAJ. Matteo G. “Regaining the High Ground: The Challenges of Perception 
Management in National Strategy and Military Operations” National Defense University, 
Norfolk, VA, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, (June 2007) 
 
McFeely, MAJ. Eugene L. “The News Media: Keeping the Public Informed or Intelligence 
for the Enemy” Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, (February 2004) 
Mark Newton Strategic News Management in the Iraq War 119000209 
74 
 
McInnes, Colin, Spectator-sport war: the West and Contemporary Conflict, (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2002) 
Miller, David (ed.) Tell me lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq, 
(London: Pluto Press, 2004) 
 
Miller, David, “The Propaganda Machine” in Miller, David (ed.) Tell me lies: Propaganda 
and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq, (London: Pluto Press, 2004) 
 
Miller, Laura, Stauber, John and Rampton, Sheldon, “War is Sell” in Miller, David (ed.) Tell 
me lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq, (London: Pluto Press, 2004) 
 
Ministry of Defence, “The Future Strategic Context for Defence: A Lesson from History” 
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/7CC94DFB-839A-4029-8BDD-5E87AF5CDF45/0/future_ 
strategic_context.pdf (accessed 01/09/2012) 
 
Moorcraft, Paul L & Taylor, Phillip M. Shooting the Messenger: The Political Impact of War 
Reporting, (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books Inc. 2008) 
 
Morrison, David E, Television and the Gulf War, (London: J. Libbey, 1992) 
 
Negron, COL Jose, “Analyzing Effects-Based Operations” white paper (Langley Air Force 
Base, VA: Air Combat Command, 2002) 
 
Paddock Jr, Alfred H, “Military Psychological Operations” in Barnett, Frank R & Lord, 
Carnes (ed.) Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the US Approach, 
(Washington DC: National Defense University Press in cooperation with National Strategy 
Information Centre, 1989) 
 
Palmer, Jerry & Tumber, Howard, Media at War: The Iraq Crisis, (London: Sage 
Publications, 2004) 
 
Payne, Kenneth, “The Media as an Instrument of War” Parameters, (Spring 2005) pp. 81-93 
Petley, Julian, ““Let the Atrocious Images Haunt Us”“ in Miller, David (ed.) Tell me lies: 
Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq, (London: Pluto Press, 2004) 
 
Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “Changing Definitions of News 
(1998)” http://www.journalism.org/node/442 (accessed 15/7/2012) 
Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “Embedded Reporters: What 
Are Americans Getting?” http://www.journalism.org/node/211 (accessed 5/4/2012) 
 
Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “The Vanishing Embedded 
Reporter in Iraq” http://www.journalism.org/node/2596 (accessed 5/4/2012) 
 
Pilger, John, “Crime Against Humanity” in Miller, David (ed.) Tell me lies: Propaganda and 
Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq, (London: Pluto Press, 2004) 
 
Mark Newton Strategic News Management in the Iraq War 119000209 
75 
 
Prentoulis, Marina and Tumber, Howard “Journalists Under Fire: Subcultures, Objectivity 
and Emotional Literacy” in Freedman, Des and Kishan Thussu, Daya, (ed.) War and the 
Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7, (London: SAGE, 2003) 
Project for a New American Century, Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and 
Resources For a New Century, (2000) http://www.newamerican century.org/ 
RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf (accessed 05/09/2012) 
Rampton, Sheldon, & Stauber, John, Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda 
in Bush’s war on Iraq, (London: Robinson, 2003) 
Rid, Thomas, War and Media Operations, (London; Routledge, 2007) 
Schechter, Danny, “Selling the Iraq War: The Media Management Strategies We Never Saw” 
in Kamalipour, Yahya R. & Snow, Nancy, (ed.) War, Media, and Propaganda: A Global 
Perspective, (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004) 
Schmidt, MAJ. Todd A. “The Global Information Environment & 21st Century Warfare: 
Targeting Public Opinion in the 5th Dimension” IO Sphere, (Spring 2007) pp. 13-18 
Sharkey, Jacqueline E, “The Television War” American Journalism Review, (May 2003) 
Snyder, LT COL, John B. “Seeing Through the Conflict: Military-Media Relations” U.S. 
Army War College, Carlisle Barracks PA, (April 2003) 
Stahl, Roger, Militainment, Inc: War, Media and Popular Culture, (London: Routledge, 2010) 
 
Summers, Harry G. On Strategy: A critical analysis of the Vietnam War, (Novato, CA: 
Presidio Press, 1982) 
 
Sun Tzu, trans. Griffith, Samuel B, The Art of War, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) 
 
Taverner, LT COL. Angus, “Learning the Lessons of the 20th Century: The Evolution in 
British Military Attitude to the Media on Operations and in War” in Connelly, Mark & Welch, 
David, War and the Media: Reportage and Propaganda, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005) 
 
Taylor, Phillip M, “The Fourth Arm and the Fourth Estate: Psychological Operations and the 
Media” in Connelly, Mark & Welch, David, War and the Media: Reportage and Propaganda, 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2005) 
 
Taylor, Phillip M. “Perception Management and the ‘War’ Against Terrorism.” Journal of 
Information Warfare 1, no. 3 (May 2002) pp. 16-29 
 
Taylor, Phillip M. “‘We Know Where You Are’: Psychological Operations During Enduring 
Freedom” in Freedman, Des and Thussu, Daya Kishan, (ed.) War and the Media: Reporting 
Conflict 24/7, (London: SAGE, 2003) 
 
Thussu, Daya Kishan, “Live TV and Bloodless Deaths: War, Infotainment and 24/7 News” in 
Freedman, Des and Thussu, Daya Kishan, (ed.) War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7, 
(London: SAGE, 2003) 
Mark Newton Strategic News Management in the Iraq War 119000209 
76 
 
 
US Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms - Joint Publication 1-02” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1998) 
 
US Department of Defense, “Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) on Embedding Media During 
Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area 
of Responsibility (AOR)” http://www.defense.gov/news/feb2003/d20030228pag.pdf 
(accessed 01/09/2012) 
 
Webster, Frank, “Information Warfare in an Age of Globilization” in Freedman, Des and 
Thussu, Daya Kishan, (ed.) War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7, (London: SAGE, 
2003) 
 
Wilson, Clay. “Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar: Capabilities and 
Related Policy Issues.” In CRS Report for Congress, RL311787 (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 2007) 
 
WVPublicBroadcasting “Jessica Lynch testifies before House Committee, part 1 of 2” 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1SqpzJ3_fzo&feature=relmfu (accessed 28/8/2012) 
 
WVPublicBroadcasting “Jessica Lynch testifies before House Committee, part 2 of 2” 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZyJI-WOWuRg&feature=relmfu (accessed 28/8/2012) 
